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I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of open tenancies-in-common leaves little doubt that 
tax law affects industry norms and individuals’ decisions.1  Open ten-
ancies-in-common have developed primarily to provide Internal 
Revenue Code section 1031 like-kind exchange opportunities for sel-
lers of real property.2  Typically, any disposition of property generates 
a gain or loss that figures into the taxable income of the person dis-
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 1 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 397 (1987) (challenging the traditional stated justification for section 
1031); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let 
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 479 (1993) (“There is no 
good reason that investors should be able to move among various real estate invest-
ments without paying taxes on realized gains when the same privilege is not accorded 
to reinvestment of sales proceeds in a different investment.”).  See Bradley T. Borden 
& W. Richey Wyatt, Syndicated Tenancy-in-Common Arrangements: How Tax-Motivated 
Real Estate Transactions Raise Serious Nontax Issues, 18 PROB. & PROP. 18, 18 (2004) (de-
scribing real estate syndicators’ efforts to create viable replacement property for in-
vestors seeking to complete section 1031 exchanges).  Open tenancies-in-common 
may raise questions or confirm positions regarding the appropriateness of certain tax 
laws.  For example, several commentators are already critical of section 1031.  But see 
Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. 643, 
667–68, 695–96 (2008) (arguing that equity generally supports tax-free like-kind ex-
changes, but not exchanges of undivided interests for interests owned in severalty).  
This Article leaves discussion of those topics for a different venue.  Instead, this Arti-
cle focuses on the existence of open tenancies-in-common and considers the issues 
they raise in the current context. 
 2 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, unless stated other-
wise. 
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posing of the property.3  Property owners may avoid the immediate 
recognition of gain under section 1031 if they acquire like-kind 
property in exchange for the relinquished property.4  If two proper-
ties are like-kind, many property owners may be indifferent about 
which property they own, but they may hesitate to change ownership 
if they must pay tax on the change-of-ownership transaction.5  Thus, 
to accept a purchase offer, property owners often need assurance that 
they will be able to find suitable like-kind property for reinvestment.  
In times of rising prices, purchase offers tend to increase, and the 
availability of replacement property tends to decrease, causing a diffi-
cult situation for many owners wishing to remain invested in like-kind 
property.6  Furthermore, property owners at the end of their property 
management life cycles may wish to acquire property that has less 
demanding management obligations.7  Finally, investors may prefer 
investment-grade property with a credit tenant8 as replacement prop-
erty, which they may not be able to acquire individually. 
Real estate syndicators, who recognized property owners’ needs 
for accessible investment-grade replacement property with minimal 
 3 Gross income includes gains from dealings in property.  I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) 
(2000).  The Internal Revenue Code defines gain or loss on the disposition of prop-
erty and generally requires recognition of gain or loss. Id. § 1001(a), (c).  Non-
corporate taxpayers are entitled to a deduction for losses, to the extent of gains plus 
some additional amounts.  Id. §§ 165(a), 1211(b). 
 4 See Id. § 1031(a)(1).  Property owners also lose any losses realized on the dispo-
sition of property.  See id.  Generally, taxpayers prefer loss recognition because it pro-
vides a tax benefit by lowering taxable income.  Because gains increase tax liability, 
taxpayers generally prefer to avoid gain recognition.  Because open tenancies-in-
common are used by property owners seeking gain deferral, this Article focuses on 
gain deferral with little additional mention of loss deferral. 
 5 Stated otherwise, the opportunity to defer gain recognition may make property 
available that owners would not ordinarily sell because of the tax implications.  See 
Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the 
Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX. L. REV. 1, 45 (1992) (“The similarity of the items ex-
changed suggests weaker nontax reasons for exchanging them, and thus a greater li-
kelihood that tax such exchanges would merely deter them, rather than raise reve-
nue.”). 
 6 The difficulty arises because the owners sell property at high prices but are un-
able to identify and acquire replacement property within the statutory time periods.  
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2000) (requiring that exchangers identify replacement 
property within forty-five days after the transfer of the relinquished property, and 
that they generally acquire replacement property within 180 days after the transfer of 
the relinquished property). 
 7 Property owners often confess the three “Ts” of ownership (tenants, trash, and 
toilets) make property management tiresome.  See Kevin Thomason, How to Keep the 
TIC’s from Biting, 42 S. FED. TAX  INST. F-1, F-1 (2007). 
 8 A credit tenant is a tenant with a high credit rating, such as a large corporation 
or professional services firm. 
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management demands, created open tenancies-in-common.9  An 
open tenancy-in-common is an ownership arrangement of a large 
piece of real estate in which several unrelated, unaffiliated, and often 
unacquainted persons take undivided ownership interests.10  The 
members of an open tenancy-in-common hire third parties to man-
age the property, thus relieving themselves of management responsi-
bilities.  As long as the undivided interests are deemed real property 
for section 1031 exchange purposes, they should generally be like-
kind to other real property and qualify as valid replacement prop-
erty.11  The combination of accessibility, section 1031 qualification, 
and minimal management responsibility for the co-owners made 
open tenancies-in-common popular a popular investment vehicle for 
certain property owners.  Property owners from all over the country 
began investing exchange proceeds in open tenancies-in-common, 
and an industry grew up to package, market, manage, and facilitate 
the creation of open tenancies-in-common.12 
Before the 2007 and 2008 market contraction, open tenancies-
in-common witnessed explosive growth.  From 2002 through 2006, 
the amount of equity invested in securitized open tenancy-in-
common interests grew significantly.13  In absolute dollars, the 
 9 See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1 (recognizing that some real estate syndicators 
have added tenancy-in-common interests to their traditional offerings of limited 
partnership interests); 2nd Quarter 2008 Numbers, TIC|TALK Q. (Omni Research & 
Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5 (listing sixty-five sponsors of 
tenancy-in-common arrangements).  Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, is an affili-
ate of Omni Brokerage, Inc.  Id. at 2.  “OMNI Brokerage is a nationwide securities 
brokerage firm specializing in investment real estate for the qualified and accredited 
investor.  Distinctive in the marketplace for its focus on Tenant-In-Common (TIC) 
investments, OMNI has been providing investors with replacement property solu-
tions for 1031 exchanges since 1995.”  1031 Exchange and TIC Investments—Omni 
Brokerage, http://www.omni1031.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).  Industry partici-
pants often refer to open tenancies-in-common as “syndicated tenancies-in-
common.”  See, e.g., Darryl Steinhause, TICs as Real Estate: Another Nail in the Coffin, 
TIC|TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 
12. 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 44–66 
 11 See Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300 (ruling that an exchange of an undivided 
interest real property for an interest in a single real property qualifies for section 
1031 nonrecognition); BRADLEY T. BORDEN, TAX-FREE LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES ¶ 3.4[4] 
(2008). 
 12 See Terrence Floyd Cuff, Section 1031 Exchanges Involving Tenancies-in-Common, 
29 REAL EST. TAX’N 53, 54 (2002); Tenant-in-Common Association, http://www. 
ticassoc.org/index.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (describing the open tenancy-in-
common industry). 
 13 A securitized open tenancy-in-common is one marketed and sold as a security 
under federal and state securities laws.  Apparently some syndicators also sold inter-
ests in open tenancies-in-common as real estate, but that practice appears to have 
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amount of equity invested in 2001 was approximately $167 million, 
but it grew to $3.7 billion in 2006.14  That represents a 2116 % growth 
in just five years.  Those figures do not include the amount borrowed 
to acquire property.  Assuming acquisition indebtedness is about fifty 
percent of the total value of the property, the industry is approxi-
mately twice as large as the amount of invested equity, meaning the 
market peaked at approximately $7.5 billion in 2006.15  After peaking 
in 2006, the amount of equity invested in open tenancy-in-common 
interests predictably contracted as the real estate market contracted.16  
Even with the recent contraction, the rapid early growth indicates 
that some form of open tenancies-in-common will likely survive the 
current market downturn.17  As a relatively new form of property 
ownership, open tenancies-in-common deserve critical legal, eco-
nomic, and tax consideration.  This Article presents the first such 
analysis. 
Contrast open tenancies-in-common with close tenancies-in-
common.18  The co-owners of close tenancies know each other and 
generally manage the property together or leave management to one 
of the co-owners.19  They work together to acquire the property or 
acquire it by inheritance.  Property owned in a close tenancy-in-
common will generally be smaller than property owned in an open 
stopped.  See Complaint at 4, Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Spann Complaint]. 
 14 See Brady Flamm, 2006 Numbers, TIC|TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, 
LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Winter 2007, at 3.  The size of the industry doubled for 
2002 ($357 million), 2003 ($756 million), and 2004 ($1.775 billion), and it grew siz-
ably in 2005 ($3.229 billion).  Id.  Numbers are not available for the sales of non-
securitized interests.  As discussed below, securities laws suggest that interests in open 
tenancies-in-common fall within the definition of security.  See infra text accompany-
ing notes 131–33.  That characterization is another reason to focus on securitized 
open tenancies-in-common. 
 15 That estimate makes open tenancies-in-common a relatively small portion of 
the estimated $210 billion of total property exchanged under section 1031 in 2003 
(the latest year that such estimates were published by members of Deloitte Tax).  See 
Dean A. Halfacre, Measuring the 1031 Market, TIC|TALK (Omni Brokerage, Inc., Salt 
Lake City, Utah), Winter 2005, at 6. 
 16 In 2007, less than $3 billion of equity closed on open tenancies-in-common.  
2nd Quarter 2008 Numbers, TIC|TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt 
Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5.  The market continued to contract during 2008.  See 
id. 
 17 This assumes tax law continues incentivize investment in tenancy-in-common 
interests.  See infra Part IV.A (discussing the viability of open tenancies-in-common in 
a non-tax-favored environment). 
 18 This Article uses the term open tenancies-in-common to parlay vernacular used 
in scholarly work to compare open business arrangements to close business ar-
rangements. 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 102–05. 
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tenancy-in-common.  Traditionally, close tenancies-in-common had 
simple co-ownership agreements, if they had them at all.  Open ten-
ancies-in-common, by contrast, have sophisticated co-ownership 
agreements.  Their formation also requires the coordinated efforts of 
many parties, including promoters, managers, securities broker-
dealers, attorneys, and other advisors.20  A significant body of corpo-
rate-law scholarship similarly considers the differences between open 
and close corporations and other business arrangements.21  This Arti-
cle recognizes differences, both legal and economic, between open 
and close tenancies-in-common. 
Tax law motivated the initial emergence of open tenancies-in-
common and greatly influences their ownership structures today.  
The viability of open tenancies-in-common to serve as like-kind re-
placement property depends significantly on the tax classification of 
open tenancies-in-common.  If tax law treats an open tenancy-in-
common as a tax partnership, the interest will not be like-kind real 
property and will not qualify for nonrecognition.22  Tax classification 
therefore affects many of the structural components of open tenan-
cies-in-common, as parties structure them to comply with tax law’s te-
nancy-in-common classification.  The tax classification of a co-
ownership arrangement, such as an open tenancy-in-common, is not 
a state law question.23  Instead, it is a matter of federal tax law and ex-
ists primarily in the common law definition of tax partnership.24  An 
arrangement that is not a tax corporation is either a tax partnership 
 20 See infra Part II.A. 
 21 Generally, the focus is on open and close corporations.  See, e.g., FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991) (focusing generally on open corporations, but focusing specifically on close 
corporations in Chapter 9); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM § 4.2 (2000) 
(discussing the economic theory for separating ownership and management and the 
optimal size of a firm).  More recent commentary also considers other business ar-
rangements, such as limited liability companies.  See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Minority 
Oppression and The Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation 
History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005). 
 22 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excluding partnership interests from the 
application of section 1031).  Furthermore, a partnership interest is personal prop-
erty, so it cannot be like-kind to real property.  UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, § 502, 6 U.L.A. 156 
(2001); see also Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225 (ruling that an exchange of real 
property for machinery did not satisfy the like-kind property requirement). 
 23 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Whether an organi-
zation is an entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of 
federal tax law and does not depend on whether the organization is recognized as an 
entity under local law.”). 
 24 See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
925, 975–1001 (2006) (reviewing the common law tests used to determine whether 
an arrangement is a tax partnership). 
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or a tenancy-in-common, as determined by the definition of tax part-
nership.25  The definition of tax partnership, however, is unclear.26  
Such lack of clarity appears to have stymied the growth of the open 
tenancy-in-common industry for a number of years.27  A 2002 IRS 
publication provided guidance regarding the classification of co-
owned rental real property and was the catalyst that spurred the 
growth of the industry.28  The IRS’s guidance dictates, to a significant 
degree, the structure of open tenancies-in-common.  This Article re-
veals, however, that some of the tax-driven elements find little sup-
port in the common law tax definition of tenancies-in-common and 
place serious strains on the economic tendencies of co-owners and 
managers. 
The coming together of promoters, managers, and numerous 
investors with disparate backgrounds, varying levels of knowledge 
about real estate investment and management, and potentially differ-
ent objectives creates economic and legal issues that the structure of 
open tenancies-in-common must contemplate.  For example, man-
 25 Id. at 936–38. 
 26 See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS ¶ 3.01[1] (4th 
ed. 2007) (describing the definition of “tax partnership” as the most basic and per-
haps most difficult question of partnership taxation). 
 27 See supra note 9 (stating that Omni Brokerage was in the business of providing 
replacement property solutions since 1995, but the industry’s significant growth did 
not occur until 2002).  The unclear definition of tax partnership led taxpayers to 
seek private guidance from the IRS regarding the proper classification of open ten-
ancies-in-common.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-19-014 (May 12, 2000).  Shortly after 
providing that guidance, the IRS publicly stated that it would not provide guidance 
on the classification of co-ownership arrangements until it had studied the issue fur-
ther.  Rev. Proc. 2000-46, 2000-2 C.B. 438.  The moratorium on rulings appears to be 
a consequence of the inflow of ruling requests and the IRS’s awareness of emergence 
of the open tenancy-in-common industry.  See Rev. Proc. 2000-46 § 2, 2000-2 C.B. 438; 
Bradley T. Borden, Exchanges Involving Tenancy-in-Common Interests Can Be Tax-Free, 
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Jan. 2003, at 4–5 (reviewing briefly the development of the 
open tenancy-in-common industry). 
 28 The guidance came in the form of a revenue procedure, which lists several 
conditions that a tenancy-in-common generally must satisfy to receive a favorable rul-
ing from the IRS regarding the arrangement’s tax classification.  See Rev. Rul. 2002-
22, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  Although the revenue procedure is merely ruling guidelines, 
taxpayers rely upon it as though it provides a safe harbor for classification.  If an ar-
rangement meets substantially all of the conditions in the revenue procedure, tax 
advisors will generally provide an opinion letter supporting the non-partnership clas-
sification for tax purposes.  See Bradley T. Borden & Todd D. Keator, Tax Opinions in 
TIC Offerings and Reverse TIC Exchanges, 23 REAL EST. J. 88, 89–96 (2007) (predicting 
that common deviations from the revenue procedure will not prevent tax advisors 
from providing a “should” level opinion, but significant deviations will likely result in 
a “more likely than not” opinion).  Following the publication of Revenue Procedure 
2002-22, the equity invested in open tenancies-in-common doubled annually for 
three years.  See supra note 14. 
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agement is often separate from ownership in open tenancies-in-
common, so the owners must consider how they might align the 
manager’s interests with their own.  Co-owners will wish to protect the 
property from claims of other owners’ creditors, so arrangements 
must provide entity shielding.29  Tenants in common traditionally 
have the power to dispose of undivided interests, partition the prop-
erty, and take possession of the property.30  Such powers, if unre-
stricted in open tenancies-in-common, could diminish the property’s 
value and create unworkable structures.  Ownership structures of 
open tenancies-in-common have evolved to provide such restric-
tions.31 
The emergence of open tenancies-in-common raises several 
questions about their independent viability and value.  Because they 
arose to fill a tax purpose, their existence may depend solely on the 
continued tax preference.  The cumbersome open tenancy-in-
common structure calls into question whether direct ownership is ne-
cessary to preserve tenancy-in-common classification under tax law.  
Finally, the resources devoted to open tenancies-in-common have 
created a new way to own and manage property.  Many aspects of 
open tenancy-in-common structures may be transferable to close ten-
ancies-in-common that heretofore could not justify the application of 
resources to invent such structures.  This Article describes the indus-
try that services open tenancies-in-common, examines the tax, legal, 
and economic aspects of open tenancies-in-common, and considers 
the issues involved with the application for close tenancies-in-
common to open tenancies-in-common.32 
 29 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of 
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1343–50 (2006) (describing the economics of entity 
shielding and its importance to business arrangements). 
 30 See John V. Orth, Tenancies in Common, in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 
32.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 1994) (recognizing the right to transfer and par-
tition); Alfred A. Heon, Comment, The Liability of a Cotenant to Other Cotenants for 
Rents, Profits and Use and Occupation, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 363, 363 (1959) (“[E]ach co-
tenant of a tenancy-in-common had an equal and several right of entry and posses-
sion, and the possession of one was the possession of all.”). 
 31 See infra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing common restrictions 
placed on disposition and partition and the reasons for them). 
 32 Space limitations restrict the potential coverage of various issues raised by 
open tenancies-in-common.  This Article focuses on tax law, property law, securities 
law, and economics.  Further analysis could also consider the implications under 
bankruptcy law and corporate law. 
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II. THE INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTS 
An industry has grown up to package, market, sell, and manage 
open tenancies-in-common.  In fact, industry participants have cre-
ated a trade organization—the Tenancy-in-Common Association 
(TICA).33  Forming an open tenancy-in-common requires the coordi-
nation of many different functions, which industry participants have 
divided along lines of specialization.  Sponsors package open tenan-
cies-in-common.34  They locate property, put it under contract or ac-
quire it, arrange for financing, and ensure the property is ready for 
transfer on the transfer closing date.35  The early success of open ten-
ancies-in-common attracted many sponsors—as many as sixty-five 
sponsors were serving the securitized open tenancy-in-common mar-
ket in 2008.36 
Because open tenancy-in-common interests are securities,37 bro-
ker-dealers generally handle the marketing and selling of open ten-
ancy-in-common interests.38  A broker-dealer is licensed to trade secu-
rities for his own account or for customers.39  Registered 
representatives often work as independent contractors for open ten-
ancy-in-common broker-dealers and have direct interaction with in-
 33 See Tenant-In-Common Association, supra note 12 (describing TICA and pro-
viding information about the tenancy-in-common industry and promoting open ten-
ancies-in-common). 
 34 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2. 
 35 See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1, at 19.  If promoters put the property under 
contract instead of acquiring it, they assign their rights in the contract to investors 
who then close on it.  Id. 
 36 See 19 of 65 Sponsors Surveyed Closed Deals in the 2nd Quarter, TIC|TALK Q. (Omni 
Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5.  Undoubtedly, 
others marketed and sold tenancies-in-common as real estate during the same pe-
riod.  For example, DBSI purportedly sold tenancy-in-common interests as real estate 
during that period.  See Spann Complaint, supra note 13, at 12.  
 37 See infra note 131. 
 38 See, e.g., 1031 Exchange and TIC Investments—Omni Brokerage, http://www. 
omni1031.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (providing information about Omni Bro-
kerage, which specializes in selling tenancy-in-common interests and claims to be the 
largest broker-dealer in the tenancy-in-common industry, based upon equity raised); 
infra note 131 (discussing the definition of a security and why open tenancy-in-
common interests fall within that definition). 
 39 See Securities Registration Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) 
(2006) (defining broker as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others”); Id. § 78c(a)(5) (defining dealer as “any 
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, 
through a broker or otherwise”); Id. § 78l(a) (requiring broker-dealers to register 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
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vestors.40  They work together to sell the interests.41  Registered repre-
sentatives may work exclusively for a broker-dealer or may own an ex-
change facilitator business and sell tenancy-in-common interests as a 
side venture.42  Such a dual purpose puts the registered representa-
tive in direct contact with potential investors.  Because most investors 
in open tenancies-in-common generally use section 1031 exchange 
proceeds to invest, broker-dealers and their representatives seek re-
ferrals from exchange facilitators.43  The objective is to attract inves-
tors who have sold real estate as a part of an intended section 1031 
exchange (or who are contemplating such a sale) but have not yet 
committed to acquire replacement property or who are still looking 
for suitable replacement property.  Exchange facilitators often know 
these potential investors and are excellent referr
A. Creation of Open Tenancies-in-Common 
The creation of an open tenancy-in-common requires the com-
ing together of several parties in a multi-step process.  The investors 
and promoters often begin their processes independently of each 
other.  They might meet only after they have each progressed along 
their respective process cycles.  First, property owners sell real prop-
erty as part of an intended section 1031 exchange, generally using a 
qualified intermediary to facilitate the exchange.44  The property 
owners, who eventually end up acquiring interests together in a spe-
cific open tenancy-in-common, probably do not know each other at 
the time they sell their own properties.  At the time of disposition, 
they may have some preferred property identified as replacement 
property and have no intent to acquire interest in an open tenancy-
in-common, but those plans may be frustrated through the exchange 
process.  Other property owners may sell property with the intent to 
exchange into an interest in an open tenancy-in-common.45  Second, 
 40 This information is based on the Author’s professional interaction and infor-
mal discussions with broker-dealers and registered representatives. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-18.  Most section 1031 exchanges are struc-
tured as multiple-party exchanges with a qualified intermediary receiving the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the relinquished property and facilitating the exchange.  See 
BORDEN, supra note 11, ¶ 4.4[3] (discussing the technical requirements that property 
owners must satisfy to obtain section 1031 nonrecognition for a multiple-party ex-
change facilitated by a qualified intermediary and describing the process of a multi-
ple-party exchange). 
 45 Section 1031 allows property owners to transfer relinquished property and lat-
er acquire replacement property, if they identify the replacement property within 
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independent of the actions of the property owners, open tenancy-in-
common sponsors locate and arrange to acquire the property for a 
new open tenancy-in-common.46  Sponsors negotiate the purchase 
price of the property, secure blanket nonrecourse financing needed 
to acquire the property, and negotiate the terms of an appropriate 
lease, if the property has a single lessee or master lessee.47  Thus, 
sponsors package the property and prepare it for acquisition by inves-
tors. 
Third, sponsors prepare an offering memorandum.48  The offer-
ing memorandum, including any addenda, will likely be hundreds of 
pages long and include copious information.49  For example, the 
memorandum might include information such as risk factors relating 
to the property, tax matters, financing arrangements, and invest-
ments in the property.50  The memorandum will also include infor-
mation about the property and the market in which the property is 
located.51  The memorandum typically identifies the sponsors and the 
managers of the property, or the master tenant, describing the man-
ner in which the co-owners will compensate them and their prior per-
formance.52  Additionally, the memorandum should summarize the 
relevant agreements that co-owners will enter into, including rights of 
first offer or refusal and call-option agreements, the tenants-in-
common agreement, and the property and asset management 
agreement.53  The memorandum also includes copies of such agree-
ments as exhibits, along with a tax opinion addressing the tax classifi-
cation of the open tenancy-in-common and the section 1031 implica-
forty-five days after the relinquished property transfer.  I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A) 
(2000).  Often property owners will sell relinquished property with no idea as to what 
they will acquire as like-kind replacement property and use the forty-five day identifi-
cation period to find suitable replacement property.  See Thomason, supra note 7 at 
F-1 (describing a typical situation that creates demand for a tenancy-in-common in-
terest). 
 46 See Cuff, supra note 12, at 54. 
 47 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-19. 
 48 See id. at F-20. 
 49 Information about offering memoranda comes from confidential materials on 
file with the Author.  This Article refers to the confidential materials as “Confidential 
Private Placement Memorandum—P.M.” because the memorandum provided for 
property-management structures, as “Confidential Private Placement Memoran-
dum—M.L.” for the memorandum issued for master-lease structures, or collectively 
as “Confidential Private Placement Memoranda” for both types of memoranda. 
 50 See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda, supra note 49. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
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tions of acquiring an interest in the property.54  Because interests in 
open tenancies-in-common are likely securities, the offering should 
comply with the exceptions to the securities registration rules.55  Most 
interests are offered under the Regulation D exception to the securi-
ties registration regime and the offering is often limited to accredited 
investors.56 
Fourth, the promoters present the tenancy-in-common offerings 
to the broker-dealers who solicit investments.  Because the primary 
investors are property owners who have sold relinquished property as 
part of an intended section 1031 exchange, the broker-dealers look 
to qualified intermediaries for referrals to potential investors.57  Qual-
ified intermediaries have knowledge about the property owner’s net 
worth because they hold exchange proceeds.58  Thus, qualified in-
termediaries can perform initial screenings and introduce broker-
dealers to those property owners with exchange proceeds that exceed 
the net worth element of the accredited investor definition.59  Ulti-
mately, interested investors execute the necessary documents and 
prepare for closing. 
Finally, the transaction closes.60  Qualified intermediaries trans-
fer investors’ exchange proceeds and the lender transfers loan pro-
ceeds to the seller of the property.  Title of the property passes to the 
investors, who take the property as tenants-in-common.61  Advisors, 
such as accountants and lawyers, the sponsor, and the broker-dealers, 
receive their fees and commissions at the closing.62  The total fees 
and commissions can equal as much as nine percent of the total value 
of the property.
Although investment in an open tenancy-in-common is passive, 
the structure—prompted by lenders—generally requires each co-
 54 See id. 
 55 See infra text accompanying notes 131–33. 
 56 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 96. 
 57 This is based upon the Author’s experience working in the section 1031 indus-
try. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Qualified intermediaries are not regulated, so they may not be bound by rules 
of confidentiality—allowing them to share information with registered representa-
tives.  They should, however, be careful not to violate the anti-disclosure rules of 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which may apply.  See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2006) (imposing privacy rules upon financial institutions, the de-
finition of which may include qualified intermediaries). 
 60 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-22. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda—P.M., supra note 49. 
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owner to form a special purpose entity to hold undivided interests in 
the property.64  Thus, most co-owners form a single-member limited 
liability company, which tax law generally disregards,65 to acquire and 
hold the undivided interest in the property.  The co-owners take ac-
tions through those entities.  After closing, the co-owners receive 
regular rent payments and service the blanket loan, but the managers 
or master lessees may handle the payment before making distribu-
tions to the co-owners.66 
B. Open Tenancy-in-Common Structures 
Promoters generally use one of two structures for open tenan-
cies-in-common: (1) the property-management structure or (2) the 
master-lease structure.67  Under the property-management structure, 
the co-owners hire a third party—usually the promoter—to manage 
the property.68  The property manager agrees to provide an annual 
budget and disburse revenue, net of operating expenses, to the co-
owners.  Operating expenses include loan payments and a reasonable 
reserve for improvements.  The manager also furnishes financial re-
ports and other notifications to the co-owners.69  The management 
agreement should contain provisions addressing the term for which 
the manager will serve.70  Because the promoters create, market, and 
manage the arrangements, they draft the governing documents to se-
cure a long-term position as manager.71  The long-term structure of 
the management arrangement indicates that the co-owners under-
stand that the acquisition of an interest in the property is subject to 
the promoter managing the property indefinitely.72  Thus, investors 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(4) (as amended in 2006). 
 66 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-23. 
 67 See id. at F-2. 
 68 See id.; Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49. 
 69 See Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda, supra note 49 
 72 See Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49.  The 
management agreement may provide, for example, that the property manager will 
serve for twenty years, unless the manager or the co-owners terminate the agreement 
or sell the property before the end of twenty years.  See id.  Although the co-owners 
may have the right to terminate the management agreement, a termination by the 
co-owners may allow the lender to accelerate the loan and trigger the manager’s op-
tion to acquire the interest from the terminating co-owners.  See id.  To comply with 
the IRS’s guidance, the co-owners must renew the management agreement on an 
annual basis.  See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (discussing the IRS’s re-
quirement that managers’ contracts be renewed annually).  Such a termination gen-
erally will, however, trigger the manager’s option or the lender’s right to accelerate 
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should consider part of the promoter’s compensation to include the 
management fee.  The benefits of the property-management struc-
ture are that it is simpler than the master-lease structure and the co-
owners participate in rent growth.73  The limitations of the property-
management structure are that co-owners can engage only in limited 
activities, either directly or indirectly through an agent,74 and the co-
owners have no protection should rents or occupancies decline.75 
Under the master-lease structure, the co-owners lease the prop-
erty to a master lessee.76  The master lessee is usually the sponsor, or 
an affiliate of the sponsor, who subleases the property to tenants, 
hires and pays a property manager, and bears the expenses of operat-
ing the property.77  The master lessee will also generally service any 
blanket liability secured by the property and pay the co-owners a 
fixed percentage of their cash investment (with possible rent bonuses 
based on the gross revenues of the property).78  The master lessee 
reaps the excess of the payments it is obligated to make to cover ex-
penses, service the liability, and pay the co-owners.79  Thus, if the 
rents increase and the expenses stay the same, the master lessee’s 
profit will increase, but a decrease in rents or an increase in expenses 
will reduce the master lessee’s profit.  This structure should shift the 
property’s economic risk of loss to the master lessee.  To the extent 
the master lessee does not have sufficient capital to meet its obliga-
tions (as is often the case), the risk of loss shifts to the co-owners 
when rental income decreases sufficiently.80  As a consequence, any 
claims that the master-lease structure protects the co-owners from 
downturns in the rental market are often illusory.81  As with the prop-
the loan.  Thus, as a practical matter, the co-owners do not have a viable opportunity 
to terminate the management agreement. 
 73 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2. 
 74 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (providing that co-owners may 
perform only customary tenant services). 
 75 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2 through F-3. 
 76 See id. at F-3; Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 
49. 
 77 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., 
supra note 49. 
 78 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., 
supra note 49. 
 79 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., 
supra note 49. 
 80 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3 (stating that most master lessees are thinly 
capitalized). 
 81 See id.  The private placement memorandum for typical master-lease structures 
identifies the limited capital of the master tenant as a risk to co-owners.  See Private 
Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49.  The memorandum notifies poten-
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erty-management structure, the master-lease structure commits the 
owners to a long-term relationship with the promoter.82  The long-
term relationship indicates that the promoters consider rents re-
tained by the master lessee to be part of their economic interest in 
the arrangement. 
The master-lease structure benefits co-owners by providing a 
flexible vehicle for operating the properties safely within the IRS’s 
guidance.83  The limitation of the master-lease structure is that it is 
more complex to organize,84 so the co-owners sacrifice simplicity to 
obtain tax certainty.  Thus, the main differences between the master-
lease structure and the property-management structure are the level 
of tax certainty (the property-management structure provides greater 
certainty), the level of structural complexity (the master-lease struc-
ture is simpler), and the potential to share in rental increases (co-
owners of a property-management structure benefit directly from in-
creases). 
C. Delaware Statutory Trusts 
Although most open tenancies-in-common are structured to be 
state-law tenancies-in-common, the IRS allows promoters to package 
open tenancies-in-common in Delaware statutory trusts, subject to 
significant restrictions.85  With such structures, the promoters form a 
Delaware statutory trust that acquires the property, and the investors 
use exchange proceeds to acquire interests in the statutory trust.86  
tial investors that the master tenant agrees to pay rent to co-owners without regard to 
the economic success of the property and warns the co-owners that their recourse 
against the master tenant is limited to the assets of the master tenant, which mainly 
include the master tenant’s right to rent from the subtenants.  See id.  Such a notice 
may be reserved for the dense pages of the offering memorandum and may not be 
prominent in other marketing efforts, such as referrals to broker-dealers from quali-
fied intermediaries, accountants, lawyers, or others who may recommend that a 
property owner consider a tenancy-in-common investment.  See, e.g., Video: How a 
TIC works and the Benefits to the Investor (Tenant-in-Common Association 2006), 
http://www.ticassoc.org/sections/education.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (pre-
senting the benefits of an investment in open tenancies-in-common without discuss-
ing the risks).  Commentators do, however, recognize the risk.  See, e.g., Thomason, 
supra note 7, at F-3. 
 82 See Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49. 
 83 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191; Richard M. Lipton et al., Delaware Statu-
tory Trusts and 1031: A Marriage Made in Heaven or Just a Pipe Dream?, 101 J. TAX’N 140, 
147–50 (2004) (discussing the limited use of Delaware statutory trusts under the rul-
ing). 
 86 See Lipton et al., supra note 85, at 145. 
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The IRS disregards the statutory trust as a separate entity, so the in-
vestors are treated as directly owning interests in the underlying 
property, which helps the interests satisfy the section 1031 like-kind 
property requirement.87  The benefit of assigning a Delaware statu-
tory trust is that the investors do not have to individually take undi-
vided interests in the property.88  Instead, the statutory trust takes title 
to the property in severalty, and the investors acquire interests in the 
statutory trust.89  The use of a Delaware statutory trust thus helps sim-
plify the structure and transfer of property. 
Business law commentators predicted that statutory trusts would 
gain favor and create new uses as a choice of legal entity.90  The use as 
an open tenancy-in-common structure is evidence of the prescience 
of those observations.  Statutory trusts provide owners limited liabil-
ity, create entity shielding, and grant almost unlimited contractual 
freedom.91  Those features make them attractive generally, but they 
are particularly useful for open tenancies-in-common.  As discussed 
below, the IRS’s guidance requires open tenancies-in-common to 
have certain features.92  The contractual flexibility of statutory trusts 
allows the members to satisfy those requirements.93  The members of 
a statutory trust cause the statutory trust to lease the property to a 
master lessee.94 
Obtaining tenancy-in-common classification to satisfy the section 
1031 like-kind property requirement motivated the formation of the 
general structures.  The various structures provide investors with 
choices, but tax classification greatly influences the details of each 
type of structure.  Even though tax law is the primary driver of open 
 87 See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191. 
 88 See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-14. 
 89 Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191. 
 90 The business trust effectively represents the minimum required of law in creat-
ing a strong entity—asset partitioning and, in particular, strong entity shielding—and 
leaves the rest to be determined by contract.  The business trust can thus be seen as 
the final step in the historical evolution of commercial entities.  See Hansmann et al., 
supra note 29, at 1397. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See infra Part III. 
 93 One obvious requirement the co-owners cannot satisfy is the direct-ownership.  
Delaware statutory trusts are separate legal entities that own the property.  The IRS 
has, however, agreed to waive the direct-ownership requirement for properly struc-
tured Delaware statutory trusts.  See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191.  That sanction 
may represent a willingness by the IRS to consider disregarding other multiple-
member legal entities, a position the Author advocates.  See Borden, supra note 24, at 
1008–11, 1026. 
 94 See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191 (considering a Delaware statutory inter-
est with a master-lease structure). 
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tenancy-in-common structures, promoters and investors must also 
consider other legal aspects and economic characteristics of such ar-
rangements.  Thus, economics, business law, and property law also af-
fect the structure and features of open tenancies-in-common. 
III. FEATURES OF OPEN TENANCIES-IN-COMMON 
Ownership, management, and transferability of interests are 
three main features of open tenancies-in-common that tax law affects.  
The tax-driven features of each open tenancy-in-common reflect a 
general effort to comply with the IRS’s guidance in order to avoid 
having the IRS treat the arrangement as a tax partnership.95  These 
features, however, often veer from the common law tax definition of 
tenancy-in-common, leaving commentators confused by the IRS’s 
guidance.96  Although this guidance is merely a list of conditions for 
advanced private rulings regarding classification,97 tax and legal advi-
sors carefully consider it when structuring open tenancies-in-
common.98  Therefore, open tenancies-in-common rarely deviate sig-
nificantly from the guidance, even though the guidance may not fol-
low the common-law tax definition of tenancy-in-common.99  Substan-
tial compliance with the IRS’s guidance creates legal structures that 
are complicated and raise economic issues.100  The relative newness of 
open tenancies-in-common hopefully suggests that the passage of 
time will help simplify and improve the features discussed below.  In 
 95 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88–89. 
 96 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139-157. 
 97 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 3, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 98 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88.  Practitioners consider the guidance 
a safe harbor because they cannot fathom the IRS taking a position that an arrange-
ment satisfying all of the conditions in the guidance is anything other than a tenancy-
in-common.  Id. 
The Service’s disavowal to the contrary notwithstanding, as a practical 
matter, the guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2002-22 will effectively become a 
safe harbor for structuring TIC interests that can be acquired as re-
placement property in like-kind exchanges.  It can be anticipated that 
tax practitioners will be comfortable issuing a favorable opinion to tax-
payers with respect to TIC interests that satisfy the requirements in the 
guidelines, whereas practitioners will be less comfortable issuing favor-
able opinions if the TIC interests are not described in these guidelines. 
 Richard M. Lipton, New Rules Likely to Increase Use of Tenancy-in-Common Ownership in 
Like-Kind Exchanges, 96 J. TAX’N 303, 306 (2002). 
 99 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88–96 (identifying situations in which 
tax advisors will provide a favorable legal opinion even if the arrangement deviates 
from the IRS’s guidance). 
 100 See, e.g., infra Part III.C (describing the unrestricted partition and disposition 
requirements and the mechanisms co-owners use to circumvent those requirements). 
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the meantime, formal structures intended to substantially comply 
with the IRS’s guidance will govern open tenancies-in-common. 
The formal structure of open tenancies-in-common stands in 
stark contrast to the ownership structure of many close tenancies-in-
common.101  The creation and method of acquiring interests in close 
tenancies-in-common often explain the lack of formal ownership ar-
rangements.  Co-owners unintentionally create close tenancies-in-
common by operation of law when a conveyance fails to satisfy all 
four unities required for joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety.102  
For example, a joint tenant’s transfer of an interest in the property 
would break the unity of title and create a tenancy-in-common.103  
Such unintentional formation may leave co-owners unaware that they 
have created a tenancy-in-common and ignorant of the issues ten-
ancy-in-common, co-ownership creates.  Consequently, they would 
not enter into a formal co-ownership agreement.  Inheritance or de-
vise may also create a tenancy-in-common.104  For example, a parent 
may die, leaving property owned in severalty to her children, who 
take the property as tenants-in-common.  The heirs of such transfers 
may not anticipate the problems that arise among tenants-in-common 
or may lack the sophistication needed to consider such problems 
and, therefore, they may not create a formal co-ownership arrange-
ment. 
 101 Some close tenancies-in-common have very formal ownership structures.  See, 
e.g., BORDEN, supra note 11, at app. F (providing sample documents for close tenan-
cies-in-common).  Such formal structures generally attempt to comply with the IRS’s 
guidance in Revenue Procedure 2002-22.  See, e.g., id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-26-
005 (June 27, 2008) (applying Revenue Procedure 2002-22 but ruling that a two-
person tenancy-in-common is not a tax partnership even though the co-owners en-
tered into buy-sell agreements, had the right to approve pledges of interests, entered 
into indemnification agreements for non-pro rata share of loan guarantees, and 
leased a portion of the property to a co-owner’s affiliate).  Aspects of modern close 
tenancies-in-common derive from the features found in open tenancies-in-common.  
Such features are found in larger close tenancies-in-common formed by sophisticated 
investors. 
 102 See Orth, supra note 30, in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30, at § 
32.06.  In some states, however, the focus is on the intent of parties at the time of 
formation and whether they use specific words in the conveyance documents.  See id.  
The four unities are the unity of interest, title, time, and possession.  See 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 180.  Tenancies by the entirety also require the unity of 
person based on marriage.  See John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety [hereinafter 
Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety], in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30, § 
33.06(b). 
 103 See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancies, in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 
30,  § 31.08(b). 
 104 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.06(b)(2) (providing that most states now presume 
that co-owned property, including property acquired by inheritance or device, is held 
as a tenancy-in-common). 
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Co-owners may create a tenancy-in-common by express limita-
tion,105 but such intentional formation does not necessarily ensure a 
formal ownership structure.  Many state statutes provide that convey-
ances of property to co-owners create tenancies-in-common, unless 
specifically stated otherwise.106  Perhaps unaware of the significance 
of their co-ownership arrangements, friends or acquaintances who 
acquire property as tenants-in-common may not seek a formal owner-
ship structure.  Others acquire property as husband and wife with 
confidence and trust in each other’s capabilities and loyalty.  Changes 
in personal relationships or ownership of the property may alter the 
nature of the tenancy-in-common ownership arrangement.107 
Business law commentators have recognized and considered the 
lack of formality of close business arrangements.  Forces that affect 
the lack of formality in close business arrangements also appear to af-
fect the lack of formality of close tenancies-in-common.  Like close 
tenancies-in-common, close business arrangements tend to be some-
what smaller and less complicated than open business arrangements 
and tenancies-in-common.108  The size of close business arrange-
ments, in terms of invested capital, often does not justify the cost of 
hiring legal counsel to help draft formal ownership documents.109  
The members of close business arrangements may not be sophisti-
cated enough to recognize ex ante the need for planning and con-
tracting.110  Finally, the members of close business arrangements gen-
erally are acquainted with each other, trust each other, and do not 
 105 See id. § 32.06(b). 
 106 See id. § 32.06(b)(2). 
 107 For example, divorce would break the unity of person required for a tenancy 
by the entirety and could render the arrangement either a joint tenancy or tenancy-
in-common, depending upon the applicable local law.  See Orth, Tenancies by the En-
tirety, supra note 102, § 33.08(d).  A spouse’s transfer of an interest in a joint tenancy 
would break the unity of title and render the arrangement a tenancy-in-common.  See 
Orth, supra note 103, § 31.08(b). 
 108 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency 
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (1986) (Close business arrangements “tend to have 
relatively few managers, who tend to be the largest residual claimants.”); Moll, supra 
note 21, at 888–89 (identifying a small number of owners, absence of market for 
ownership interests, owner participation in management, and owner relationships as 
characteristics typical of close business arrangements). 
 109 See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 477 (1995) (“Many small businesses . . . will elect not to assume 
the expense of negotiating, and hiring an attorney to draft, a carefully worded oper-
ating agreement.”). 
 110 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (recognizing that 
failure to contract in close corporations often reflects “ignorance, lack of imagina-
tion, or poor legal advice”). 
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foresee any potential dispute, or they prefer not to raise doubts about 
mutual trust by broaching the idea of entering into formal agree-
ments.111  As a result, they often do not create sophisticated owner-
ship arrangements.  Similar factors would explain the lack of formal 
agreements among many co-owners of close tenancies-in-common.112 
In contrast, open business arrangements tend to be larger, with 
members from varying backgrounds who have no prior relationship 
or acquaintance with each other.  Those factors suggest the need for 
greater structure in contractual arrangements, more available re-
sources to consider and address issues raised by the structure, and 
fewer impediments to prevent the members from creating formal 
structures.  The size of many open tenancies-in-common similarly 
supports and justifies hiring legal counsel to draft sophisticated own-
ership documents and consider state-law issues.113  The co-owners’ 
lack of mutual acquaintance motivates the co-owners to enter into 
agreements that anticipate and address future events.  The volume of 
open tenancy-in-common arrangements allows legal advisors to im-
prove structures as they handle multiple open tenancies-in-common 
over an extended period of time.114  Advisors also become more famil-
iar with open tenancies-in-common as they share their experiences 
and ideas with each other informally, formally at conferences, and 
 111 See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: 
The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1348 (2003) 
(“[S]hareholders may opt not to adopt shareholder contracts because they choose to 
rely on their mutual trustworthiness, and because proposing and bargaining over 
these contracts can undermine the often fragile trust that exists at the beginning of 
ventures.”). 
 112 The formation of a tenancy-in-common often may evidence the naivety of in-
vestors because sophisticated investors may prefer to acquire and own property in 
some form of legal entity. 
 113 The IRS guidelines explicitly allow co-owners to enter into agreements that run 
with the land.  See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.04, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The co-ownership 
agreement takes the place of the partnership agreement used in traditional, syndi-
cated structures. 
 114 A few decades ago, one commentator recognized the need for accessible in-
formation about tenancies-in-common: 
The purpose of this article is, therefore, two-fold: first, to assist busy 
practicing lawyers in preparing cases involving the relative rights of co-
tenants where the amount involved does not make possible exhaustive 
research; and second, to make some small contribution to an organiza-
tion and rationalization of the law on the subject and the development 
of a better body of law. 
Dudley Weible, Accountability of Cotenants, 29 IOWA L. REV. 558, 558 (1944).  Similar 
phenomena helped standardize documentation and other common features of busi-
ness arrangements.  See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 253–56 (1984) (discussing the role of the transac-
tional attorney in adding value to transactions). 
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through published materials.  Recognizing activity in the area, the 
IRS also takes an interest and influences its development through 
published guidance.  As a consequence, the structures arguably be-
come better, and the ideas and sophistication of the structures be-
come more common and accessible to members of close tenancies-in-
common and their advisors.115  Thus, the rise of open tenancies-in-
common has helped expose issues prevalent with all tenancies-in-
common, has formalized the features of open tenancies-in-common, 
and has provided opportunities for addressing those issues and ana-
lyzing the features. 
A. Ownership Features 
The ownership features of open tenancies-in-common serve dual 
purposes: they seek to comply with the IRS’s guidance and they ad-
dress the co-owners’ lack of mutual acquaintance.  The guidance in-
cludes several conditions that affect the ownership features of open 
tenancies-in-common.116  First, it provides that the co-owners must 
hold the property as tenants-in-common, as defined ostensibly by 
state law.117  Nonetheless, some of the features in the guidance differ 
significantly from features of traditional tenancies-in-common and 
may alter the legal attributes of the arrangement.  The conditions 
limit co-owners’ use and management of the property and conse-
quently appear to destroy the unity of possession, a fundamental cha-
racteristic of tenancies-in-common.118  Unity of possession grants each 
co-owner the right to possess the whole property.119  Therefore, no co-
owner has the right to exclude the other co-owners from possession 
or to solely possess any portion of the property, unless the other co-
owners do not contest such possession.120  Unity of possession also es-
 115 As an example, sample documents for close tenancies-in-common are now 
publicly available.  See BORDEN, supra note 11, at app. F. 
 116 The conditions in the guidance arguably ensure that an arrangement is not a 
tax partnership.  Presumably the IRS would not challenge the classification of an ar-
rangement that satisfies all of the conditions in the guidelines.  They do not, how-
ever, necessarily comply with the federal definition of tax partnership.  See Borden & 
Keator, supra note 28, at 88–89.  To err on the side of safety, most open tenancies-in-
common comply with most of the conditions in the guidance, but deviate only when 
they believe the law justifies such deviations.  See id. at 89–96. 
 117 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (prohibiting ownership in a sepa-
rate legal entity from holding title to the property as a whole). 
 118 See infra text accompanying notes 163–65 (discussing the restrictions on use 
and management and how the restrictions might affect the unity of possession). 
 119 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(a). 
 120 See Weible, supra note 114, at 558.  Ousted co-owners may bring an ejectment 
action to recover possession, and failing to do so may lead to lost title by adverse pos-
session.  See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(d). 
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tablishes the parties’ claims to income from the property.  For exam-
ple, an ousted co-owner may bring an action under common law for 
accounting to recover a share of the fair market rental value of the 
property.121  The IRS’s guidance requires a different accounting 
method.122  Such requirements may destroy the unity of possession. 
If the IRS’s guidance frustrates the unity of possession, open te-
nancies-in-common may be something other than tenancies-in-
common under state law.  State law classification is important for tax 
purposes because the IRS’s guidance appears to require the ar-
rangement to be a tenancy-in-common under state law.123  If the co-
ownership arrangement disrupts the unity of possession, arguably the 
arrangement would fail to satisfy that condition of the guidance.  
Nonetheless, the IRS must anticipate that, to the extent its guidance 
creates internal inconsistency, the published guidance must accom-
modate the IRS’s over-arching purpose, which is to provide guide-
lines for entity classification.124  Thus, if following the guidance results 
in an entity that is not a tenancy-in-common under state law, the 
guidance should disregard state-law classification.  Otherwise, the IRS 
could choose between the two alternatives to argue on audit for the 
position that favors it.125  Thus, if the IRS’s guidance creates some-
thing that is not a state-law tenancy-in-common, open tenancies-in-
common appear to represent arrangements that tax law classifies in-
dependently of state-law classification.126 
Regardless of the tax-law classification, state law must address the 
classification and significance of open tenancies-in-common.  Classi-
fication issues are generally derivative of other issues, such as liability 
of members or management rights, which are the immediate issues in 
state-law classification cases.127  For example, if the arrangement is not 
 121 See Weible, supra note 114, at 558. 
 122 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (requiring the co-owners to 
share revenue and expenses in proportion to their ownership interests in the prop-
erty). 
 123 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 124 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 1, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 125 The tax consequences of tax classifications often are not apparent on the date 
an arrangement comes into existence.  See Borden, supra note 24, at 969–70.  Depend-
ing upon the issue, the parties may prefer one classification above another.  Id. at 
957–70 (identifying the tax consequences of tax partnership classification).  The 
guidelines should provide some certainty to avoid such potentialities. 
 126 Tax law often disregards state law in determining whether an arrangement is a 
tax partnership or tax corporation.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended 
in 2006) (providing that arrangements that are not corporations under state law—
e.g., partnerships and limited liability companies—may elect to be tax corporations). 
 127 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP § 2.02(a) (2007). 
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a state-law tenancy-in-common, it could be a state-law partnership.128  
That could expose the co-owners to joint and several liability for the 
other co-owners’ actions performed on behalf of the arrangement 
and could also impose duties of loyalty and care on the co-owners.129  
Provisions in standard open tenancy-in-common ownership docu-
ments address some of those issues, but state-law classification may 
raise unforeseen issues and consequences.  Time will tell whether 
state law respects the arrangement and the parties’ agreements and 
treats them as tenancies-in-common or disregards the tax classifica-
tion and treats the arrangements as state-law partnerships. 
The IRS’s guidance generally allows no more than thirty-five 
persons to join an open tenancy-in-common.130  That limitation does 
not reflect property law, nor does it find support in tax-entity classifi-
cation; the IRS appears to have extracted that limitation from securi-
ties law.  An interest in an open tenancy-in-common appears to be a 
security under the Securities Act of 1933.131  Therefore, sellers gener-
ally must register interests in open tenancies-in-common to sell 
them.132  Exemptions, in particular the private offering exemption, 
permit the sale of unregistered securities, if the offering is limited to 
 128 See id.  § 2.06(b). 
 129 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, §§ 306 and 404, 6 U.L.A 117 and 143 (2001) (describing 
partner liability and standards of conduct). 
 130 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.02, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The guidelines treat a husband 
and wife as a single person for the thirty-five-owner limitation and treat all persons 
who acquire interests in the property by inheritance as a single person.  See id.  
Therefore, the number of co-owners of an open tenancy-in-common could exceed 
thirty-five actual persons without violating the thirty-five person rule. 
 131 Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities of Act of 1933 defines securities to include 
“any . . . investment contract.”  Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(a)(1) (2006).  The Supreme Court held that the term “investment contract” in-
cludes interests in real property if investors acquired interests in the property as part 
of “a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely 
through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.”  SEC v. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (holding that land sales contracts, warranty 
deeds, and service contracts related to narrow strips of property in citrus groves were 
investment contracts where investors, with no knowledge of managing such groves, 
relied upon a management company for profit).  Open tenancies-in-common grant 
investors interests in property, include an ownership agreement and management 
agreement, and allow the co-owners to rely upon managers to earn a profit.  There-
fore, interests in open tenancies-in-common appear to come within the securities law 
definition of investment contract.  A recent lawsuit seeks $2 billion damages from 
promoters of open tenancies-in-common who did not register the interests as securi-
ties or seek to come within one of the registration exceptions.  Complaint at 22, 
Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008).  That 
case could further clarify whether interests in open tenancies-in-common are securi-
ties. 
 132 See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1). 
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no more than thirty-five purchasers.133  Those exemptions appear to 
be the source of the thirty-five-owner limitation.  The thirty-five-owner 
limitation does not reflect a tax principle, but it may evince sound 
economic concepts in the absence of other mechanisms that would 
protect investors from unscrupulous promoters. 
As the number of co-owners increases, the actual control of any 
co-owner would tend to decrease, assuming that co-owners have pro-
portionate ownership in the arrangement.134  Diminution of control 
would make the arrangement look more like a large publicly traded 
company.135  As control diminishes, investors become further re-
moved from the management of the property.  As a consequence, 
they become less familiar with the management of the property and 
have less access to information.  To ensure that investors in open 
business arrangements have access to information, securities laws re-
quire disclosure of information and registration of securities in ar-
rangements that will have more than thirty-five investors.136 
Distance from management in large companies justifies the thir-
ty-five-person limit for exemption from the securities registration 
rules, but the IRS’s guidance has other mechanisms for ensuring ac-
cess to information.  For example, because the guidance requires 
unanimous consent of the co-owners for certain actions, including 
hiring and retaining managers,137 the unanimous-consent require-
ment grants each owner, regardless of ownership interest, the power 
to veto major actions.  Managers’ need for annual approval of each 
co-owner also helps ensure that the co-owners will acquire regular in-
formation about the mangers’ performance.  Thus, diminution of 
 133 See Securities Act of 1933, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d ; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii) 
(as amended in 1992), 230.506(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1989). 
 134 If a single co-owner had a super majority, diluting the ownership of the minor-
ity by spreading it among an increasing number of co-owners generally would not af-
fect the control of the majority co-owner.  Perhaps if the pre-dilution minority co-
owners generally favored the acts of the majority co-owner, dilution could, if nothing 
else, create an annoyance for the majority co-owner. 
 135 See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that 
partners’ control diminishes as more partners join the partnership). 
 136 See supra text accompanying notes 131–33 (discussing the registration re-
quirement and exemptions to it); see also CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH 
MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS § 7.06 (4th ed. 2008) 
(discussing the history of the private placement exemption and the rationale for the 
thirty-five-person limit). 
 137 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  Promoters, however, use op-
tions and other mechanisms to minimize the effect of such rules.  See infra text ac-
companying notes 268–69. 
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control and lack of investor information do not appear to be the ra-
tionale for the IRS’s thirty-five-person limitation.138 
The IRS’s thirty-five-person limitation appears to be arbitrary 
from a tax perspective, but it may reflect a concern that more owners 
will convert the arrangement to a tax partnership or tax corporation.  
Unfortunately, that concern finds little support in tax theory.  Part-
nership tax law and tax partnership classification are intended to fa-
cilitate tax accounting and reporting.139  The integration of property 
and services and the method for determining residual risk causes 
complexities in tax accounting and reporting.140  The number of 
owners does not affect tax accounting and reporting.  For example, 
the accounting and reporting issues do not change if a piece of prop-
erty managed by a third party is owned by ninety instead of thirty-five 
persons.  In either situation, if the manager provides only customary 
tenant services for fair market value, the co-owners should generally 
share revenue and expenses in proportion to their ownership inter-
ests, and the parties can trace income from resources they own.141  
Therefore, the thirty-five person limitation remains an inexplicable 
aspect of open tenancies-in-common. 
The IRS’s guidance also prohibits co-owners from doing things 
that would evince an intent to form an arrangement that is a legal en-
tity separate from its members.142  The definition of partnership ap-
pears to provide that parties who hold themselves out as partners or 
members of another form of business entity,  such as a limited liabil-
ity company, should be estopped from taking a tax position that the 
 138 If the unanimous-consent rule vests owners with too much control, the inter-
ests may not be securities under the 1933 Securities Act.  See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 
421–23.  Furthermore, if the owners must rely upon specialized skills or knowledge 
or a manager, they may not have control that is sufficient to overcome the invest-
ment contract test.  See id. at 423–24 (“[A] partnership can be an investment contract 
only when the partners are so dependent on a particular manager that they cannot 
replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate control.”).   
 139 See H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 53 (1932) (providing that the Congress enacted a 
statutory definition of tax partnership to “make it easier for the members to deter-
mine the distributive shares in the [partnership] gains and losses which are to be in-
cluded in their returns”); Borden, supra note 24, at 941–57. 
 140 See Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements, 
37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),, available at ssrn.com/paper=1365933. 
 141 See infra text accompanying notes 145–49. 
 142 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.03, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (prohibiting the co-ownership 
arrangement from (1) filing a partnership or corporate tax return; (2) conducting 
business under a common name; (3) executing an agreement that identifies the co-
owners as partners, shareholders, or members of a separate business entity; and (4) 
holding themselves out as some form of business entity).  The prohibited activities 
are those that evidence a subjective intent to form a partnership.  See BROMBERG & 
RIBSTEIN, supra note 127, § 2.05(b). 
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arrangement is anything other than what the intent manifests.143  
Thus, the restriction is consistent with the current definition of tax 
partnership, which adopts both an estoppel and an intent test.144  
That does not, however, mean that tax theory supports the IRS’s 
guidance on this issue. 
The economic theory of tax partnership would reject the thirty-
five person limit and the intent restriction, however, if the owners do 
not have an ownership interest in any services that generate in-
come.145  Under the economic theory of tax partnerships, a tax part-
nership should exist only if the parties are unable to trace income 
from co-owned resources.146  Tenancies-in-common, as a general rule, 
grant the owners of the respective interests in the property rights to 
income from the property in proportion to their ownership inter-
ests.147  Thus, the co-owners are able to trace income from the prop-
erty based on their respective ownership interests in the property.  
Such simple arrangements do not need the complex rules that apply 
to tax partnerships and tax corporations, nor should they be allowed 
access to them.148  Intent is not relevant if the parties do not share 
ownership and control of both property and services.  The number of 
owners an arrangement has does not change that conclusion.  The 
thirty-five person limit remains inexplicable.  Even though economic 
theory does not support the intent test, the IRS’s adoption of the in-
tent test is consistent with the current definition of tax partnership 
and the state-law definition of tenancy-in-common.149  An adherence 
to those rules explains the IRS’s adoption of the intent test. 
 143 See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97–98 (9th Cir. 1952) (using estoppel 
to hold that an arrangement is a tax partnership). 
 144 See Borden, supra note 24, at 980–82 (concluding that the courts have derived 
an intent test from the substantive-law definition of partnership); id. at 1000–01 (de-
scribing the estoppel test).  But see Lewis v. Comm’r, 23 T.C. 538, 550 (1954); Lulu 
Lung Powell v. Comm’r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 161 (1967) (holding that an arrangement 
that filed a partnership tax return was not a tax partnership). 
 145 See Borden, supra note 140. 
 146 See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming May 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121351. 
 147 Enforcing such rights may be difficult because of the application of the various 
remedies, which include actions for waste, contribution, account, and ejectment.  See 
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07. See generally Weible, supra note 114. 
 148 See Borden, supra note 24, at 951–56. 
 149 The IRS generally will not consider whether a co-ownership arrangement is a 
tax partnership if immediately before its creation the co-owners held the property 
through a partnership or corporation.  See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.03, 2002-1 C.B. 
733.  This provision reflects the IRS’s long-standing position that a distribution of 
property to members of a business arrangement immediately prior to an exchange 
should disqualify the exchange from section 1031 treatment.  See Rev. Rul. 77-337, 
1977-2 C.B. 305.  However, the IRS has been unsuccessful in presenting that position 
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The IRS’s guidance requires co-owners to share indebtedness se-
cured by a blanket lien on the property in proportion to their undi-
vided interests in the property.150  To the extent a blanket lien is a 
nonrecourse loan, the nature of the indebtedness will ensure that the 
co-owners share the indebtedness proportionately.151  Possibilities of 
disproportionate sharing of debt arise when the indebtedness is re-
course.  In such situations, if the co-owners are jointly and severally 
liable for the indebtedness, they may agree among themselves to use 
indemnification provisions or other agreements to disproportionately 
allocate the indebtedness.  The co-owners may change a liability that 
would otherwise be nonrecourse into a recourse liability if one or 
more co-owners guarantees all or a portion of the liability.  Such ar-
rangements would violate the IRS’s guidance, but disproportionate 
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness does not appear to be inconsis-
tent with the common law tax definition of a tenancy-in-common.152  
Furthermore, proportionate sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness 
may make investing in such arrangements unattractive for some 
property owners.153 
The IRS’s unfavorable view of disproportionate sharing of blan-
ket-lien indebtedness may derive from a common practice among 
to courts.  See, e.g., Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting 
section 1031 nonrecognition to an exchange of property occurring immediately after 
a corporation distributed it to the exchanger); Mason v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1134 (1988) (holding that an exchange of undivided interests received from a part-
nership could qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition).  Thus, the IRS’s position 
finds little support in case law. 
 150 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.09, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The IRS defines “blanket lien” 
as “any mortgage or trust deed that is recorded against the [p]roperty as a whole.”  
Id. § 4. 
 151 The holder of nonrecourse indebtedness has recourse only against the prop-
erty securing it.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (8th ed. 2004).  Any blanket nonre-
course loan would be secured by the property as a whole, and if the lender pro-
ceeded against the property to collect the loan, it would affect each co-owner in 
proportion to the interests in the property they hold. 
 152 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93.  The prohibition of disproportionate 
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness also appears to violate equity.  See id. (providing 
an example of inequity the prohibition creates). 
 153 Investors often have different levels of comfort regarding leverage.  Some may 
be more comfortable with larger levels of indebtedness, whereas others may need a 
specific level of indebtedness to preserve nonrecognition for their exchange.  Sec-
tion 1031(d) provides that liability discharged as part of an exchange is taxable boot.  
I.R.C. § 1031(d) (2006). If, however, the exchanger requires replacement property 
subject to the same amount of liability that was discharged, the discharged liability 
will not be taxable as boot.  See Treas. Reg. §1.1031(d)-2, ex. 2 (1956).  Thus, if an 
exchanger’s proportionate share of the blanket-lien indebtedness is insufficient to 
cover the discharged liability, the exchanger must find a way to compensate for the 
difference. 
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partners: specially allocating partnership liability, which allows part-
ners to disproportionately share partnership liability.154  Dispropor-
tionate sharing of liability is not unique to partnerships, however.  
Common law allows tenants in common to disproportionately share 
blanket-lien indebtedness by entering into indemnification agree-
ments or by guaranteeing blanket-lien indebtedness.  Disproportion-
ately sharing blanket-lien indebtedness should not be deemed to be 
an activity that would create a tax partnership.155  The prohibition 
against blanket-lien indebtedness also encourages co-owners indi-
vidually borrowing against their own interests.  By borrowing indi-
vidually against their respective interests, co-owners can obtain a debt 
structure that would mirror an arrangement with disproportionate 
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness.156  The IRS prohibition thus ap-
pears to do nothing other than cause unneeded complexities.  Con-
sequently, lawyers do not hesitate to counsel investors that the dis-
proportionate sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness should not 
frustrate the tenancy-in-common classification.157 
Without a doubt, the IRS’s guidance significantly influences the 
ownership features of open tenancies-in-common.  However, several 
of the ownership features lack support in tax law and economic the-
ory.  The features could place members of open tenancies-in-
common at a competitive disadvantage in the market.  The IRS 
should consider revising its guidance to comply more closely with tax 
and economic theory.  In particular, it should remove both the thirty-
five person limit and the prohibition against disproportionate sharing 
of blanket-lien indebtedness.  It should also consider whether the in-
 154 See I.R.C. § 752 (treating changes in a partner’s share of partnership liability as 
partner contributions or distributions to the partner); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (as 
amended in 2006) (listing items to consider in determining a partner’s obligation for 
partnership liabilities.). 
 155 Tax practitioners recognize that the IRS’s guidance on this issue deviates from 
the definition of tax partnership.  Consequently, they will write tax opinion letters 
stating that co-ownership arrangements with disproportionate sharing of blanket-lien 
indebtedness are more likely than not tenancies-in-common for tax purposes.  See 
Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93.  Many persons who invest in open tenancies-
in-common use section 1031 exchange proceeds to acquire their interests.  Section 
1031 requires parties to offset liability on relinquished property with liability on re-
placement property.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2, ex. (2) (1956).  Generally, the 
parties acquiring interests in open tenancies-in-common will need different liability-
to-investment ratios on their acquired tenancy-in-common interests to accurately off-
set the liability they had on replacement property.  See Borden & Keator, supra note 
28, at 93. 
 156 See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93 (providing examples of arrange-
ments that subject co-owners to similar liability with respect to their interests in 
property, even though one arrangement has blanket-lien indebtedness). 
 157 See id. 
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tent test is necessary and whether the co-owners should be allowed to 
own the property through legal entities in addition to statutory trusts.  
Finally, it should focus on rules that ensure the separate ownership of 
the property and services.  The guidance should prohibit property 
owners from providing services and prohibit service providers from 
owning an interest in the property.  Those modifications would help 
the guidance comply with existing tax law and theory and ease the 
economic difficulties the guidance causes. 
B. Management Features 
Investors often buy interests in open tenancies-in-common to re-
lieve themselves of management responsibilities.158  They delegate the 
management responsibilities to professional property managers.  
Therefore, the arrangement must provide for the management of the 
property, orderly distribution of the property’s income, and sharing 
of expenses.  The IRS’s guidance specifically addresses many man-
agement aspects of open tenancies-in-common.  Co-owners and man-
agers structure their arrangements with the IRS’s guidance in mind, 
but also must incorporate other legal and economic concepts into 
their agreements. 
A significant part of the IRS’s guidance is the unanimous con-
sent requirement.  This guidance requires the co-owners to approve 
unanimously: (1) the hiring of managers; (2) any disposition of the 
property; (3) leases of any portion of the property; and (4) any action 
related to a blanket lien.159  The IRS’s unanimous-consent require-
ment for disposing of the property and borrowing against the prop-
erty as a whole reflects the concept of concurrent ownership, namely 
that each co-owner has an undivided interest in the property that is 
freely alienable.160  Consequently, a single co-owner cannot unilater-
ally sell the entire property or offer the entire property as collateral 
for a loan.  Instead, single co-owners can act according to their re-
spective interests and may unilaterally sell those interests or offer 
 158 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 159 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The IRS’s guidance allows co-
owners to agree to be bound by the majority vote of the undivided interests or any 
other action.  Id.  The IRS’s guidance prohibits co-owners from granting another 
person a global power of attorney to act on behalf of the co-owner, but co-owners 
may grant a specific power of attorney to allow someone else to carry out actions that 
the co-owners have approved.  Id. 
 160 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02 (“Each tenant in common possesses an interest 
in the concurrent estate that is alienable, devisable, and inheritable.”). 
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them as collateral for personal loans.161  A creditor who forecloses on 
an undivided interest in property takes the rights the debtor-co-owner 
had, and a purchaser of such an interest subrogates the rights the 
seller-co-owner had.162  By negative inference, others cannot sell or 
encumber another co-owner’s interest without the co-owner’s con-
sent.  Therefore, the IRS’s unanimous-consent requirement appears 
to focus on preserving a fundamental feature of traditional tenancies-
in-common. 
The unanimous-consent requirement nullifies aspects of unity of 
possession.  Under common law, all tenants in common have the 
right to possess the property.163  The right to possess the property 
vests the co-owners with power to lease unilaterally their rights to any 
person, which would vest the lessee with the right to possess the 
property, but not to prohibit other co-owners from taking posses-
sion.164  The majority of states requires the co-owners to share rents 
and profits received from non-co-owners with the other co-owners.165  
These common law rules demonstrate that a single co-owner may 
lease the property to a third party by leasing an undivided interest in 
the property.  The IRS’s requirement that co-owners must unani-
mously approve leases of any portion of the property appears to over-
ride the common law right to lease an undivided interest in the 
property and vest the lessee with the right of possession.  Thus, the 
unanimous consent requirement distinguishes open tenancies-in-
common from unstructured close tenancies-in-common. 
The IRS’s unanimous-consent requirement for hiring a manager 
also appears to be inconsistent with the common-law definition of te-
nancy-in-common.  A co-owner’s unilateral right to hire managers is 
implicit in the co-owners’ actions for contribution or accounting un-
der common law.  The common law actions for accounting and con-
tribution help establish that co-owners may unilaterally hire managers 
in tenancies-in-common governed by common law.  Common law al-
lows any co-owner to improve the property, but a co-owner who im-
proves the property has an action for contribution against the other 
co-owners only if the other co-owners agreed to be liable for a share 
 161 See id. § 32.07(e) (recognizing that each co-owner has an interest in the prop-
erty to which a creditor may attach a security interest). 
 162 See id. (providing that a creditor who acquires a debtor co-owner’s interest has 
no rights greater than the debtor co-owner had). 
 163 See id. § 32.07(d); Weible, supra note 114, at 558. 
 164 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(d). 
 165 See Weible, supra note 114, at 559–62 (discussing the laws that govern rent-
sharing in situations where a co-owner is in sole possession and a third party is in 
possession of the property). 
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of the improvement costs.166  The co-owner who improves property 
can recover the costs in an accounting for rents and profits collected 
from non-co-owners only to the extent the improvements increase 
the rents.167  If the property can be conveniently divided, the im-
prover will take the improved portion in an in-kind partition action; 
otherwise, the improver will be awarded any increase in value from 
the improvements in a partition by sale and distribution.168  A co-
owner who repairs the property has no right of contribution for the 
repairs unless the nonrepairing co-owners agreed to be liable for the 
costs of repairs or the repairs are necessary to preserve the estate.169 
The rules relating to actions for contribution and accounting 
indicate that a co-owner may improve or repair property or hire oth-
ers to perform the repairs or improvements.  Co-owners would not 
have to resort to actions for contribution or accounting if they had 
agreed to improvements or repairs.170  The remedies are therefore 
available only when a co-owner acts unilaterally.  The IRS’s unani-
mous-approval requirement thus modifies the rights generally pos-
sessed by tenants in common to manage the property and hire man-
 166 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b) (“[A] cotenant cannot be compelled to con-
tribute to the expenses of improvement, lest the costs reduce, or even destroy, the 
unrealized value of the undivided share.”). 
As a general proposition in the absence of an express or implied 
agreement to pay for improvements, a cotenant may not charge the 
property of his cotenant with contribution for the cost of improve-
ments.  Otherwise stated, the rule is that there is no recovery at law for 
improvements and whatever relief a cotenant may secure must be in 
equity. 
Weible, supra note 114, at 577 (citations omitted). 
 167 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b) (“[I]ncreased income attributable to the im-
provement should be allocated to the improver.”).  Because any doubts about the in-
creased income will be decided against the improver, prudence suggests a co-owner 
should obtain an agreement from other co-owners before making the improvements.  
See id. 
 168 See id.  The right to partition provides any dissatisfied co-owner a remedy if the 
action of contribution does not provide the desired outcome, so the rules do not at-
tempt to make an improver whole.  See id. 
 169 See id.  The rationale for enforcing contribution for the cost of necessary re-
pairs is that an action for waste is available to enforce the duty to make such repairs, 
and necessary repairs to do not improve a co-owner out of an estate.  See id.  Public 
policy may not, however, discourage permissive waste, so courts could deny both the 
action for waste and the action for contribution; thus, leaving dissatisfied co-owners 
with the action of partition to deal with perceived or actual harms.  See id.  The re-
pairing partner may recover the costs through adjustments made in a partition or in 
an accounting action.  See id. (referring to costs of improvements, but similar rules 
should apply to costs of repairs because actions for accounting should recognize out-
lays made by the repairer). 
 170 See supra text accompanying note 166. 
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agers unilaterally.  This is another example of how open tenancies-in-
common differ from unstructured close tenancies-in-common.  It also 
illustrates the IRS’s disregard for state-law tenancies-in-common.  Al-
though common law does not appear to prohibit unanimous consent 
for hiring property managers, it does not require such consent. 
The IRS’s basis for requiring unanimous consent for certain ac-
tions is unclear.  This deviation from common law indicates the IRS is 
not merely concerned in ensuring that open tenancies-in-common 
retain common law features of tenancies-in-common.  The unani-
mous-consent requirements may derive from the centralized man-
agement characteristic of obsolete classification rules.171  Before the 
Treasury promulgated the check-the-box regulations in 1997, tax law 
classified tax partnerships and tax corporations using entity charac-
teristics.172  One of those characteristics was centralized management, 
which delegates owners’ decision-making authority to managers, who 
may not be owners.173  The characteristics traditionally distinguished 
tax partnerships and tax trusts from tax corporations; they did not 
distinguish tax partnerships from tax tenancies-in-common.174 
Entity classification rules abandoned a centralized management 
requirement when the Treasury promulgated a formalistic elective 
classification regime.175  The IRS appears to have revivified the cen-
tralized-management characteristic in its tenancy-in-common guid-
ance, which distinguishes tax partnerships from tenancies-in-
common.  The irony is that centralized management does not appear 
to be a characteristic used to distinguish tenancies-in-common from 
tax partnerships.176  Thus, in revivifying the centralized-arrangement 
characteristic, the IRS applies it to a new classification issue.  Its ap-
plication appears tenuous, however, because it disallows arrange-
 171 Earlier income tax regulations listed several characteristics that the Treasury 
considered common to entities and that distinguished entities from arrangements 
that are aggregates of their owners.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960) 
(listing the following as characteristics of entities: (1) associates; (2) an objective to 
carry on  business and divide the gains therefrom; (3) continuity of life; (4) centrali-
zation of management; (5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property; 
and (6) free transferability of interests). 
 172 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2(a)(2), -2(a)(3) (1960). 
 173 See id. § 301.7701-2(c). 
 174 See id. §§ 301.7701-1, -2(a)(2), -2(a)(3). 
 175 See id. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (providing that any business en-
tity that is not a tax corporation is a tax partnership, unless it elects to be a tax corpo-
ration).  A tax corporation is defined generally as any arrangement incorporated un-
der state law.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2008). 
 176 See Borden, supra note 24, at 975–1001 (listing the tests used to distinguish tax 
partnerships from tenancies-in-common and other disregarded arrangements). 
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ments to do that which the common law allows in tenancies-in-
common, which would not generally affect their tax classification. 
The IRS has relaxed its unanimous-consent requirement some-
what, apparently in reaction to market demands.  Many open ten-
ancy-in-common co-owners may have no interest in the management 
of the property and would prefer to defer to others for decisions 
about hiring managers, leasing the property, or financing the prop-
erty’s maintenance and improvement.  Requiring unanimous consent 
for all actions thus frustrates the objectives of investors who wish to 
have a passive investment.  It also causes administrative difficulties 
because those who lack the interest may not take the time to vote or 
may simply disregard notice of pending notes.  Realizing that many 
investors, even in open tenancies-in-common, prefer little or no in-
volvement, the IRS has ruled privately that co-owners may provide si-
lent consent after receiving written notice of certain actions.177  As 
modified by the private ruling, the IRS’s guidance moves a step closer 
to allowing centralized management and adhering to traditional as-
pects of tenancies-in-common.  Centralized management is a com-
mon feature of open business arrangements,178 and the IRS’s move in 
that direction reflects an understanding of market realities.  As long 
as the managers are paid a fair market rate for their services, the 
manner in which they are hired or retained should not affect the 
classification of an arrangement.179  The IRS could move further to al-
low centralized management. 
 177 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-27-003 (ruling that a co-owner satisfies the consent 
requirement by not replying to a proposed action within a certain time period).  
Open tenancies-in-common use provisions such as the following in co-ownership 
agreements to facilitate the consent requirement and allow for passive investment: 
Whenever in this Agreement the consent or approval of the Tenants in 
Common is required or otherwise requested with respect to any deci-
sion, each Tenant in Common shall have a period of time (the “Ap-
proval Period”) ending on the date that is seven days after the date the 
request for such consent or approval is given in which to give written 
notice of its approval or disapproval of such decision.  Each Tenant in 
Common agrees to use its best efforts to timely respond to any request 
for consent or approval.  If a Tenant in Common does not give written 
notice of its disapproval of such decision with the Approval Period, 
such inaction shall constitute approval of such decision by the Tenant 
in Common. 
Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 90. 
 178 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 
J. L. & ECON. 301, 308–09 (1983) (presenting an economic theory for separation of 
ownership—referred to by Fama and Jensen as residual claims—and management, 
referred to as decision control, in larger business arrangements). 
 179 See supra text accompanying notes 145–49 (discussing the theory of partnership 
tax and significance of integrating services and property in classification). 
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The IRS’s guidance also limits the type of activities that a co-
owner may perform with respect to the property.  Under the guid-
ance, a co-owner may perform only customary rental services.180  This 
allowance deviates from the definition of a tax partnership, which 
provides that if a partner contributes services to a co-ownership ar-
rangement, the arrangement will be a tax partnership.181  Partnership 
tax law exists to facilitate tax administration and simplify tax account-
ing and reporting.182  Arrangements become complicated and need 
partnership tax account and reporting rules when parties contribute 
property and services to a common business venture.183  In such ar-
rangements, the parties take an interest in all contributed resources 
and cannot accurately identify the source of income they receive 
from the arrangement.184  The income may be from contributed 
property or contributed services, resources in which all members 
have an interest.  The inability to trace income requires tax account-
ing rules that deviate from the assignment-of-income doctrine.185  
Thus, instead of looking to the source of income, the law looks to al-
location provisions to determine the members’ shares of income 
from arrangements that integrate resources.186  Partnership and cor-
 180 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11 2002-1 C.B. 733 (“The co-owners’ activities must be 
limited to those customarily performed in connection with the maintenance and re-
pair of rental property customary activities.” (citing Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 
261).  The IRS’s guidance generally imputes to the co-owners activities performed by 
parties related to the co-owners and the co-owners’ agents.  See id.  (disregarding ac-
tivities of a co-owner who holds an interest in the property for less than six months). 
 181 The definition of tax partnership distinguishes between the type of service an 
arrangement provides and the source of the service.  See Borden, supra note 24, at 
992–98.  An arrangement is not a partnership if a manager receiving fair manage-
ment fees provides only customary tenant services with respect to the property.  See 
Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. at 261.  If a co-owner provides the same services, the ar-
rangement is probably a tax partnership.  See Cusik v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 
241, 243 (1998). 
 182 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 183 See Borden, supra note 146. 
 184 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organizations, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (suggesting that parties inte-
grate resources to increase output and to help monitor behavior); Borden, supra 
note 140 (discussing the accounting difficulty integration creates); Benjamin Klein, 
Robert G. Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 308–24 (1978) (providing exam-
ples of resource integration). 
 185 See Borden, supra note 24, at 951–56 (describing the inability to apply the as-
signment-of-income doctrine to arrangements that integrate property and services or 
services of multiple parties); Darryll K. Jones, Toward Equity and Efficiency in Partner-
ship Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1070–71 (2006) (recognizing the relationship 
between the assignment-of-income doctrine and the partnership allocation rules). 
 186 See Borden, supra note 140. 
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porate tax rules address difficulties raised by integrating property and 
services.187  In the case of tenancies-in-common, the classification 
question should be whether the arrangement needs the partnership 
tax accounting and reporting rules. 
By allowing co-owners to provide customary tenant services, the 
IRS’s guidance ignores partnership tax theory and the definition of 
tax partnership.  If a co-owner provides customary tenant services, the 
co-owners can no longer trace income from its sources and must use 
allocation rules to determine the co-owners’ shares of the arrange-
ment’s income.188  By allowing such activities, the IRS’s guidance ap-
pears to misinterpret existing laws that permit co-owners to pay third-
party managers market value to provide customary tenant services.189  
That allowance does not frustrate the parties’ ability to trace income 
from its source.190  If parties to an arrangement are able to accurately 
trace income from the contributed resource to the contributor, the 
arrangement does not need the partnership tax rules.191  Instead, the 
arrangement should allocate income to parties based upon the re-
sources they own.  As owners of the property, the co-owners can have 
income only from the property, and the service provider can have in-
come only from services.192  Allowing the co-owners to provide cus-
tomary tenant services would frustrate the ability to trace income 
from its source. 
The ability to trace income from property to the owners of 
property justifies disregarding tenancies-in-common for tax purposes.  
Each co-owner has an interest in property and, as a general rule, is 
entitled to a proportionate share of income from the property.193  Be-
 187 See id. (discussing the current tax classification rules and how they should dis-
tinguish between different business arrangements, even though they may fall short 
under the current regime). 
 188 See id. 
 189 See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (ruling that a co-ownership arrangement 
was not a tax partnership even though the co-owners paid a manager fair market val-
ue to provide customary tenant services). 
 190 Service providers can trace income from their services and property owners 
can trace income from the property they own, so they do not need allocation rules.  
See Borden, supra note 140. 
 191 See Borden, supra note 140. 
 192 See Borden, supra note 140 (using an example of an apartment owner and 
manager to describe the ability to allocate income from its source in the case of ar-
rangements where parties retain the unitary residual risk of the respective resources). 
 193 See infra text accompanying notes 221–29 (describing the rights a tenant-in-
common generally has in property).  The general rule is that each co-owner is enti-
tled to a proportionate share of the property’s income, even though parties may have 
the right to offset for expenses incurred in maintaining the property and may not be 
made whole until they dispose of the property. 
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cause the parties can trace income directly from their interests in the 
property, they do not need the partnership tax accounting and re-
porting rules, and those rules should be off limits to such arrange-
ments.194  Thus, the guidance should prohibit the co-owners from 
providing any service with respect to the property, but allow them to 
hire a third party to provide customary tenant services for fair market 
compensation.  It disregards tax law by allowing co-owners to provide 
customary tenant services. 
Co-owners of open tenancies-in-common generally hire a third 
party to manage the property.195  The IRS’s guidance permits any per-
son other than lessees to manage the property.196  The IRS, however, 
limits the manner in which the co-owners may compensate the man-
ager; specifically, the IRS’s guidance prohibits the manager from 
sharing in the profits or income of the property.197  This rule appar-
ently derives from the joint-profit test of the definition of tax partner-
ship.198  Apparently, the IRS is concerned that if a manager performs 
the services for a percentage of the profits or income of the arrange-
ment, the manager could be deemed to be a partner.199  Several 
courts have, however, found that a tax partnership does not exist, 
even though a service provider shares profits with property owners.200  
Thus, profit sharing alone does not establish that an arrangement is a 
 194 See Bradley T. Borden, Policy and Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax Partner-
ships, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 367–68 (2008) (reasoning that access to the partnership 
tax accounting and reporting rules should not be elective). 
 195 See supra text accompanying note 7 (recognizing that co-owners of open tenan-
cies-in-common seek to relieve themselves of the three Ts of property ownership). 
 196 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The IRS’s guidance provides 
that co-owners may hire a co-owner or any party related to the co-owner to manage 
the property, but to be consistent with the other condition, the IRS must anticipate 
that any services a co-owner (or party related to the co-owner) provides will be lim-
ited to allowed customary tenant services.  Id.  The IRS’s guidance also permits the 
manager to maintain a common bank account but requires the manager to disburse 
funds within three months after receiving them.  See id. 
 197 See id. (requiring further that the fee paid to a manager not exceed the fair 
market value for the manager’s services). 
 198 See Borden, supra note 24, at 984–91 (describing the joint-profit test as a test 
that excludes from the definition of tax partnership arrangements that lack a join 
profit motive). 
 199 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 2, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (citing Bergford v. Comm’r, 12 F.3d 
166 (9th Cir. 1993) and the manager’s share of profits as authority for tax partner-
ship treatment of arrangements with profit-sharing). 
 200 See, e.g., Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078–79 (1964) (holding that a profit-
sharing arrangement between an insurance agent and the insurance company was 
not a tax partnership); Copeland v. Ratterree, No. 5215, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4556, 
at *13 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 1957) (holding that control, not profit-sharing, is important 
in determining whether an arrangement is a tax partnership). 
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tax partnership.  If the compensation paid to the manager reflects 
fair market value, its dependence on profits should not matter in de-
termining what the manager owns.201  The IRS thus adds a restriction 
that is not found in the common law definition of tax partnership.  
Perhaps the IRS erred on the side of caution in prohibiting profit 
sharing with managers, but its rule has significant economic ramifica-
tions. 
Often, ownership and management are combined in close busi-
ness arrangements but are separated in open business arrange-
ments.202  Parties separate ownership and control to obtain the bene-
fits of specialized capital allocation and specialized management.203  
Owners will often share profits with managers or grant them an own-
ership interest to reduce agency costs and to help ensure that their 
divergent interests align.204  The IRS’s guidance allows co-owners to 
grant ownership interests to a manager who provides only customary 
tenant services, but forbids profit sharing.205  Thus, the guidance vio-
lates the tax definition of tenancy-in-common and prohibits the use 
of profit sharing to align the interests of owners and managers.  If 
managers do not have an ownership interest, the anticipated conse-
quence of the profit-sharing restriction interest is that managers will 
 201 See Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694–95 (1986). 
 202 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 228–29 (providing that a com-
mon feature of close corporations is that principal investors often manage the corpo-
ration).  Describing the differences between control features in a large public corpo-
ration and a closely held corporation, Professor Moll states:  
In the traditional public corporation, the shareholder is normally a de-
tached investor who neither contributes labor to the corporation nor 
takes part in management responsibilities.  In contrast, within a close 
corporation, a more intimate and intense relationship exists between 
capital and labor.  Close corporation shareholders usually expect em-
ployment and a meaningful role in management, as well as a return on 
the money paid for [their] shares. 
 Moll, supra note 21, at 888 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 203 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 178, at 312 (“[S]ince decision skills are not a ne-
cessary consequence of wealth or willingness to bear risk, the specialization of deci-
sion management and residual risk bearing allowed by unrestricted common stock 
enhances the adaptability of a complex organization to changes in the economic en-
vironment.”). 
 204 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 232–33 (“Compensation agree-
ments link changes in managers’ wealth to performance of the firm, which reduces 
though it cannot eliminate the divergence of interest implied by the separation of 
management and risk bearing.”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
323 (1976) (recognizing that firms use compensation to help reduce agency costs). 
 205 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §§ 6.11, 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing co-owners to pro-
vide customary tenant services, but prohibiting profit sharing with managers). 
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act in their own self-interest to the detriment of the owners.  Indeed, 
a recent lawsuit brought against the promoters of several open tenan-
cies-in-common suggests that managers may have followed that pre-
dictable course.206 
If the co-owners cannot use traditional mechanisms such as 
shared ownership or profit sharing, government regulation should 
help align parties’ interests.  Fortuitously, securities regulation helps 
fill the gap the IRS’s guidance creates.207  Stringent penalties under 
the securities laws help motivate promoters to disclose their perform-
ance with respect to other properties they manage and to disclose all 
information about the property in the offering.208  Such disclosure 
provides information that will likely influence investor behavior.  For 
example, prior mismanagement will destroy a promoter’s reputation 
and make capital more expensive in future offerings.209  Disclosing 
prior performance would therefore appear to dissuade investment.  
Thus, the securities laws help compensate for an apparent deficiency 
in the IRS guidance.  With no indication from the IRS that this was its 
intent, the gap filling appears to be a coincidence. 
 206 See generally Complaint, Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) (alleging that the promoters of nonsecuritized open tenan-
cies-in-common committed several counts of fraud regarding various aspects of the 
offering and property). 
 207 The application of securities laws appears fortuitous because, apparently, no 
evidence exists to suggest that the IRS contemplated the applicability of the securities 
laws. 
 208 For example, federal securities laws allow a person to rescind a purchase, if the 
seller used untrue statements of material facts or omits material facts in an offering. 
Any person who offers or sells a security [through communication], 
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state 
a material fact . . . , shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such se-
curity from him, who may sue . . . to recover the consideration paid for 
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income re-
ceived thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he 
no longer owns the security. 
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2000). 
 209 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel recognize the efficiency of capital 
markets, which should apply similarly to other markets, such as the open tenancy-in-
common market. 
Few markets are as efficient as capital markets.  Poor performance 
leads the markets to respond in ways that bring the costs home to the 
mangers.  First, investors (both informed and uninformed) will pay less 
for shares.  The more investors believe that their dollars will be used by 
those in control of firms in ways inconsistent with maximizing the value 
of the firm, the less they will pay for shares.  To minimize this rational 
fear, those in control have incentives to adopt governance mechanisms 
that limit their discretion to benefit at the investors’ expense. 
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 96. 
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The IRS’s guidance also prohibits a lessee from paying rent as a 
percent of income or profits derived by any person from the prop-
erty.210  This prohibition apparently derives from the joint-profit test 
of tax partnership classification.211  However, the joint-profit test does 
not definitively answer whether an arrangement is a tax partner-
ship,212 so the IRS’s absolute prohibition is not consistent with the de-
finition of tax partnership.  The prohibition also limits the types of 
arrangements that co-owners may use to reduce lessee opportunistic 
behavior.  The inability to share tenant income may place members 
of open tenancies-in-common at a disadvantage in the market. 
Property owners and tenants commonly use revenue-sharing ar-
rangements to automatically adjust rent payments to reflect changes 
in the market and to share the risks of owning and using the prop-
erty.213  For example, if the tenant’s business improves, the rental 
agreement may provide that the co-owner will receive more rent.  
The lease also could provide for reduced rental payments if business 
slows down.  The reason for such provisions in leases is that a tenant’s 
income is often both a function of the tenant’s efforts and the prop-
erty.  Without such mechanisms, members of tenancies-in-common 
may be unable to attract some tenants in periods of escalating rents 
and may witness greater rental delinquencies in periods of declining 
rents.  Although the IRS’s guidance does not prohibit co-owners to 
determine rent as a percentage of revenue, determining whether an 
 210 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.13, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  Leasing arrangements must be 
bona fide leases for federal tax purposes and must reflect the fair market value for 
the use of the property.  Id.  The amount of rent may depend upon a fixed percent-
age of receipts or sales, but it may not depend upon “net income from the 
[p]roperty, cash flow, increases in equity, or similar arrangements.”  Id. 
 211 See Borden, supra note 24, at 984–91 (describing the use of the joint-profit 
test); supra text accompanying notes 197–201 (discussing the joint-profit test and the 
IRS prohibition of profit-sharing with managers). 
 212 See Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078–79 (1964); Copeland v. Ratterree, No. 
5215, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4556, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1957). 
 213 See Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d 623, 625 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“Leases that no one would doubt were bona fide involve some, and some-
times considerable, sharing of business risks between landlord and tenant to their 
mutual benefit.”). 
[Percentage rent] is common, economists conjecture, in part because 
it shares with partnerships the agreeable feature of risk sharing, . . . 
(this as we said is a common function of leases and does not transform 
them into partnerships), in part because it reduces the cash-flow de-
mands of the tenant (so it is a form of lending by landlord to tenant). 
Id. at 626; WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENTS 258–61 (13th ed. 2008) (describing various methods, including per-
centage rent, that parties use to determine rents). 
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arrangement is a revenue-sharing arrangement and not a profit-
sharing arrangement may be difficult.214 
The master-lease structure provides an opportunity for co-
owners to allow others to share in increased rental income, without 
sharing profits or income.215  Under such a structure, the promoter 
forms an affiliated entity (a master tenant) to lease the property from 
the co-owners.216  If the rents increase, the master tenant may pay a 
rental bonus to the co-owners.217  If the rent decreases below the costs 
of managing the property the master tenant will become insolvent 
and stop making rental payments to the co-owners.218  Such structures 
allow the tenants to share in the upside of rental increases and to 
bear the risk of market downturns.  Furthermore, the IRS guidelines 
do not appear to restrict the master tenant’s sharing of profits with 
subtenants.  Thus, although a master-lease structure may not be a 
pure profit-sharing arrangement with the co-owners, it does allow 
them to share in the arrangement’s financial performance with oth-
ers.  Such arrangements may be more consistent with the tax defini-
tion of tenancy-in-common than the IRS’s guidance. 
The IRS’s guidance provides that co-owners must share revenue 
and expenses of the property in proportion to their undivided inter-
ests in the property.219  That requirement represents another devia-
tion from common law.  Common law provides fairly sophisticated 
rules that determine co-owners’ shares of the profits and expenses of 
the property.220  Common law allows co-owners to enforce their rights 
to profits or expenses through an action for waste, contribution, or 
accounting.221  The rules have a degree of vagueness because co-
owners may settle differences through the equitable remedy of parti-
tion and courts hesitate to assume a supervisory role in ongoing co-
ownership relationships.222  The rules do not, however, provide that 
the co-owners must share revenues and expenses from the property 
 214 See Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust, 9 F.3d 623 (deciding that a crop-sharing ar-
rangement was not a profit-sharing arrangement, even though the landlord paid 
some of the costs of farming the property). 
 215 See supra text accompanying notes 76–85 (explaining the master-lease struc-
ture). 
 216 Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 220 See generally Weible, supra note 114.  (describing tenants’ rights to revenue and 
responsibility for expenses of the property). 
 221 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07. 
 222 Id. 
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in proportion to their undivided interests in the property.  A co-
owner’s right to income from the property or obligation to pay ex-
penses of the property often depends upon whether the co-owner is 
in possession of the property. 
Under common law, nonpossessing co-owners generally are not 
entitled to rent from co-owners who take possession of the property 
because all co-owners have a right to possession.223  Instead of claim-
ing a right to rent, a nonpossessing co-owner may take possession of 
the property.224 A nonpossessing co-owner may, however, offset fair 
rental value if a possessing co-owner makes expenditures with respect 
to the property and seeks to recover a share of the expense through 
an action of contribution.225  An ousted co-owner who brings an ac-
tion for accounting may be entitled to the fair rental value for the 
ousted co-owner’s interest in the property.226  In the absence of an ac-
tion for contribution or ejectment, however, the possessing co-owner 
may enjoy the actual economic benefit of possessing the property.  
Because a nonpossessing co-owner may not receive a benefit from the 
property while the possessing co-owner enjoys possession, the com-
mon law does not appear to require proportionate sharing of reve-
nue. 
A co-owner who makes a payment necessary for the preservation 
of title, such as property taxes or mortgage payments, may recover a 
portion of the payment from other co-owners in an action for contri-
bution only if the jurisdiction makes the co-owners personally liable 
for such payments.227  If the jurisdiction provides that payments are 
only a charge against the property, the co-owner who makes pay-
ments may be able to recover a portion of the expenditures as a de-
fensive offset in an action for accounting for rents collected from the 
property or in a partition action.228  Finally, if the co-owner who 
makes payments is in sole possession of the property, the nonpossess-
ing co-owner may offset the value of sole possession against claims for 
contribution.229  The common law therefore does not require propor-
tionate sharing of expenses, and if offset is the only recourse against a 
 223 Weible, supra note 114, at 559. 
 224 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(c). 
 225 See Weible, supra note 30, at 566–75. 
 226 See id. at 558. 
 227 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b). 
 228 Id. (recognizing that the expense-paying co-owner may “attain the same eco-
nomic result by equitable liens so that in case of partition (in kind or by sale and di-
vision of the proceeds) or in an action of accounting the tax-paying cotenant will be 
compensated”); Weible, supra note 114, at 567. 
 229 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b)–(c). 
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non-possessory co-owner, a significant amount of time could elapse 
between the payment and recovery. 
The greater sophistication of open tenancies-in-common sug-
gests that co-owners would include revenue- and expense-sharing 
provisions in the agreement instead of relying upon common-law re-
medies.230  Because the IRS’s guidance generally prohibits co-owners 
from managing or leasing the property, they each should have similar 
ownership interests in the property.  As a result, it would be a very 
unusual situation (e.g., where a co-owner provides customary tenant 
service) in which the co-owners consider anything other than propor-
tionate sharing of the revenue and expenses of the property.  There-
fore, even though co-owners of close tenancies-in-common may not 
agree to share revenue and expenses proportionately, co-owners of 
open tenancies would likely always agree to do so, even without the 
requirement in the IRS’s guidance.231  Consequently, the guidance’s 
deviation from the common law may be immaterial.232 
The IRS’s guidance generally prohibits co-owners from advanc-
ing funds to each other to cover expense contributions.233  This pro-
hibition also deviates from the common law rule, which may deny an 
action for contribution by a co-owner who is in possession of the 
property.234  The denial of contribution creates a de facto loan grant-
ing the injured co-owner an equitable lien; on disposition or in an ac-
tion for accounting, the party seeking contribution may recover the 
 230 Indeed, the co-ownership documents for both the managed property and the 
master-lease structures include revenue and expense sharing provisions. 
 231 A dissatisfied owner of an interest in an open tenancy-in-common should be 
able to enforce the agreement and require a distribution of revenue.  In fact, the IRS 
guidelines require the manager of an open tenancy-in-common to distribute revenue 
(net of expenses) from the property to the co-owners within three months after re-
ceiving the revenue.  Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  That requirement 
should help nullify the actions for contribution and accounting. 
 232 It would, however, result in allocations that do not reflect economic reality if a 
co-owner provides customary tenant services.  A co-owner who provides customary 
tenant services should be allocated a share of revenue (or decreased share of ex-
penses) to reflect compensation for the services.  Proportionate sharing of revenue 
and expenses would not account for the services, unless the co-owners pay the service 
provider fair market value.  Tax law should account for allocations that do not reflect 
economic reality.  See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internaliza-
tion of Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 333–44 (2008).  This issue reveals 
another reason why tax law should treat an arrangement as a tax partnership if an 
owner contributes services to the arrangement. 
 233 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733.  The guidelines allow a co-owner to 
borrow funds needed to meet expenses associated with the co-ownership interest 
from another co-owner, the sponsor, or the manager only if the borrower accepts in-
dividual liability for the loan and it does not exceed thirty-one days.  Id. 
 234 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b). 
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requested payments if appropriate.235  Thus, the IRS prohibition ap-
pears to deviate from the common law of tenancies-in-common, 
which allows equitable liens. 
The IRS’s guidance also limits the parties from whom co-owners 
may borrow against the property and their respective interests there-
in.  Specifically, with respect to any debt encumbering the property 
or any debt incurred to acquire an interest in the property, the lend-
er cannot be a person related to a co-owner, the sponsor, the man-
ager, or a lessee of the property.236  This restriction should relate to 
the definition of tax partnership, but, as with many provisions in the 
guidance, such relationships appear tenuous.  If a loan is negotiated 
at arm’s length and at fair market rates, it should not affect the classi-
fication of the arrangement, regardless of the relationship between 
the lender and the co-owner or the role the lender plays in the ar-
rangement.  As with the rules regarding lease arrangements, this rule 
places members of open tenancies-in-common at a competitive disad-
vantage.  Members of other arrangements may borrow from related 
parties without adversely affecting the arrangement’s classification.  
The limits the IRS’s guidance placed on co-owners may increase their 
costs of capital by limiting sources of financing. 
The IRS’s prohibition against inter-co-owner lending finds little 
support in economic theory.  A lender who takes a security interest in 
the property of a borrower also takes an interest in the property but 
does not become an owner of the property.  The lender may require 
the borrower to seek lender approval before transferring, leasing, 
improving, or further encumbering the property.  Thus, by granting 
a security interest, the borrower transfers some rights with respect to 
the property and may subject the property to some lender restric-
tions.  Nonetheless, the borrower retains all rights not contracted 
away to the lender.237  Therefore, at the termination of the security 
interest, the borrower would have full control of the property and 
should be the owner of the property.238  The source of the loan 
should not affect that analysis, and the IRS overreaches by prohibit-
ing inter-co-owner loans. 
The management features that derive from the IRS’s guidance 
leave much to be desired.  First, the guidance restricts the co-owners’ 
tendency to use profit sharing to influence manager behavior.  Sec-
ond, it places open tenancies-in-common at a competitive disadvan-
 235 Id. 
 236 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.14, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 237 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 201, at 695. 
 238 Id. at 694. 
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tage by restricting the manner in which they may charge rent.  Fi-
nally, it limits the source of financing for open tenancies-in-common.  
The damage appears to be gratuitous because the tax definition of 
tenancy-in-common neither prohibits profit sharing with managers or 
tenants, nor does it restrict sources of financing.  The IRS should, 
therefore, revisit the guidance and make adjustments as necessary to 
conform with partnership tax law and theory. 
C. Marketability Features 
The common law has traditionally accepted vague accounting 
and distribution rules for tenancies-in-common because dissatisfied 
co-owners could sell their interests or bring partition actions to ter-
minate the relationship and receive an equitable portion of sale pro-
ceeds.239  The IRS’s guidance imposes strict accounting and distribu-
tion rules, but it expressly requires co-owners to retain the right to 
dispose of their interests and partition the property.240  It then allows 
certain agreements that could help deter or prevent dispositions and 
partition actions.  For example, other co-owners or the promoter may 
acquire an option to obtain an interest from a co-owner who con-
templates selling an interest or partitioning the property.241  Such ar-
rangements could nullify the stated right to dispose of an interest or 
partition the property.  The IRS’s guidance thus appears to recognize 
that strict accounting and reporting rules somewhat diminish the 
need for free transferability and an absolute right to partition the 
property.  As long as co-owners have an ostensible right to partition 
the property, however, the co-owners will be concerned about who 
joins the arrangement.  They will, therefore, use tools at their dis-
posal to restrict the transfer of interests.  Restricted transferability dis-
tinguishes open tenancies-in-common from open business arrange-
ments. 
Several conditions in the IRS’s guidance affect the marketability 
of interests in open tenancies-in-common.  At first blush, the market-
ability features appear most concerned with preserving the alienabil-
ity of co-ownership interests and the co-owners’ rights to property—
features the IRS apparently believes are paramount to a tenancy-in-
 239 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07. 
 240 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (requiring proportionate sharing of 
revenue and expenses and the distribution of net revenues within three months after 
the date of the receipt of the revenues); Id. § 6.06 (requiring co-owners to retain the 
right to transfer, partition, and encumber their respective interests). 
 241 Co-owners may grant rights of first offer and first refusal, id. § 6.06, or call op-
tions in their interests, id. § 6.10. 
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common classification.  The marketability features thus limit the type 
of restrictions co-owners can place on each other’s ability to dispose 
of property or partition it.242  Transferability is a prominent feature of 
traditional tenancies-in-common.243  It stands in stark contrast to the 
restrictions members of close business arrangements commonly place 
on ownership interests.244  The purpose of transfer restrictions in 
close business arrangements is to keep ownership within a small con-
trol group—control being one of two primary concerns in close cor-
porations.245  Members of close tenancies-in-common may have simi-
lar desires if they are fully informed when acquiring their interests.  
Restricting transferability of interests and the right to partition would 
eliminate a traditional remedy available to co-owners and require 
other remedies to fill the void.  Tax theory does not, however, suggest 
that limitations on transferability and void-filling remedies should 
dictate an arrangements’ classification. 
Co-owners of close tenancies-in-common would appear to be 
motivated by conditions similar to those that motivate members of 
close business arrangements to restrict transfers of interests.  Co-
owners would generally prefer to choose the persons with whom they 
will co-own the property.  Transferability of interests prevents mem-
bers of close tenancies-in-common from choosing their co-owners.  
Nonetheless, the common law appears to prevent tenants in common 
from imposing such restrictions.  Even if co-owners choose the per-
sons with whom they originally form a tenancy-in-common, the inabil-
ity to restrict transferability prohibits them from choosing future co-
owners.  Co-owners cannot control who will own other interests in the 
property, but they may sell their own interests if they become dissatis-
fied with other owners.  If selling the interest is not feasible, a co-
owner can bring an action of partition to either receive a portion of 
the property in severalty or a portion of the proceeds from the sale of 
the property.246  Thus, close tenancies-in-common invert the transfer-
ability feature commonly found in close business arrangements and 
 242 Id. § 6.06 (“In general, each co-owner must have the rights to transfer, parti-
tion, and encumber the co-owner’s undivided interest in the Property without the 
agreement or approval of any person.”).  The IRS’s guidance does not however pro-
hibit restrictions on the right to transfer, partition, or encumber interests in the 
property—if a lender requires such restrictions and the restrictions are consistent 
with customary commercial lending practices.  Id. 
 243 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02. 
 244 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 889–92. 
 245 See Moll, supra note 21, at 889–92.  Liquidity is the other primary concern.  Id. 
 246 Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07. 
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subject themselves to the possibility of owning the property with un-
desirable co-owners. 
As business arrangements grow and ownership and management 
begin to diverge, transfer restrictions lose their appeal.  Owners of 
open business arrangements generally prefer free transferability of 
interests because it encourages investment in the arrangement and 
performs a monitoring function.  Freely transferable interests are at-
tractive to investors because the transferability provides a form of li-
quidity.247  Free transferability performs a monitoring function be-
cause managers’ desire for inexpensive capital motivates them to act 
in the best interest of shareholders to attract cheap capital.  The free 
transferability of ownership creates a market for the interests, and the 
market value of the interests reflects the performance of manage-
ment and helps align management’s interests with the owners’ inter-
ests.248  Thus, free transferability of interests often distinguishes open 
and close business arrangements and fulfills an important role for 
open business arrangements. 
Free transferability of interests in open tenancies-in-common is a 
very unattractive feature because the members also have a right to 
partition the property.  Property held in open tenancies-in-common 
generally will not be suitable for partition in kind.  For example, 
commercial or residential rental property (such as an office building 
or an apartment complex) generally does not lend itself to physical 
partition; partition by sale and distribution of proceeds may result in 
a sale below the price the property could attract through a routine 
market sale.  Consequently, the co-owners of open tenancies-in-
common will insist upon restricting the right to partition the property 
or will restrict the right that other co-owners have to dispose of the 
property in order to control who becomes a co-owner.  Restricting 
the right to dispose of the property will have limited effect in an open 
tenancy-in-common.  The co-owners in an open tenancy-in-common 
are not familiar with each other, and  they do not know each other’s 
tendencies.  They may join an arrangement with others who are in-
clined to partition the property.  Thus, the right to partition is prob-
lematic in open tenancies-in-common and dampens the effect of 
transfer restrictions. 
As stated above, the right to partition is an important remedy in 
close tenancies-in-common because other remedies are often vague 
and courts prefer not to interfere.249  The right to partition is less im-
 247 See Hansmann et al., supra note 29, at 1376–77. 
 248 See supra note 209. 
 249 See supra text accompanying note 222. 
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portant in open tenancies-in-common that are structured pursuant to 
the IRS’s guidance, because co-co-owners have a right, by agreement, 
to a proportionate share of the property’s revenue and should receive 
that share regularly.  They can bring a breach of contract action to 
enforce the agreement.  Consequently, they do not need to use parti-
tion to enforce their rights to revenue.  That being the case, the IRS’s 
guidance should be able to dispense with the right-to-partition re-
quirement.  If the co-co-owners did not have a right to partition, re-
strictions on transferability would be less important.  If the IRS elimi-
nated the right-to-partition requirement co-owners may relax their 
transfer restrictions.  Until the IRS removes the right-to-partition re-
quirement, co-co-owners will look for ways to restrict transferability of 
interests. 
The IRS’s guidance allows co-co-owners of open tenancies-in-
common to grant call options in their interests and to grant other co-
owners the right of first offer or first refusal before selling an inter-
est.250  These permitted arrangements grant co-owners some control 
over who will become co-co-owners after formation of the open ten-
ancy-in-common.  The co-owners’ control cannot, however, exceed 
the resources they have available to acquire the interests of a depart-
ing co-co-owner.  Consequently, the ability to restrict transferability 
through rights to acquiring interests may be limited.  The inability to 
effectively restrict transfer, and the owners’ right to partition, may ul-
timately affect the attractiveness of interests in open tenancies-in-
common. 
The IRS does not explain its reasoning for requiring free trans-
ferability and the right to partition.  Presumably, the IRS had in mind 
the alienability and partition features of common-law tenancies-in-
common.  Perhaps it reasoned that an arrangement could not be a 
tenancy-in-common for tax purposes, unless the interests in the ar-
rangement were transferable and the co-co-owners had the right to 
 250 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.06, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing rights of first offer and 
first refusal,); id. at § 6.10 (allowing co-owners to grant call options in their interests).  
The right of first offer grants the holder of the right the first opportunity to offer to 
purchase an interest, in the event the owner of the interest decides to sell the inter-
est.  Id. § 6.06.  The owner of an interest grants a right of first refusal to another per-
son by agreeing to offer the interest to such other person before exercising the right 
to transfer the interest.  The IRS’s guidance appears to distinguish between rights of 
first offer and rights of first refusal, limiting the use of the right of latter to situations 
in which a co-owner contemplates partition.  See id.  Some commentators question 
whether there is any practical distinction between a right of first offer and right of 
first refusal.  See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1, at 20–21.  Thus, the distinction the 
IRS appears to draw may be meaningless in practice. 
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partition.251  Transferability of interests does not, however, make an 
arrangement a tenancy-in-common.  As stated above, a common fea-
ture of open business arrangements is transferability of interests.252  
In fact, free transferability is a relic of the entity-characteristic classifi-
cation regime.253  Ironically, under the old classification regime, free 
transferability was an arrangement constituting a tax corporation.  
Transferability of interests no longer distinguishes tax partnerships 
from tax corporations.254  Close business arrangements with transfer 
restrictions can be either tax corporations or tax partnerships.  Simi-
larly, open business arrangements with publicly-traded interests can 
be either tax partnerships or tax corporations.255  Just as the other en-
tity characteristics should not govern the tax classification of open 
tenancies-in-common,256 neither should transferability. 
Tax policy does not suggest that an arrangement with restricted 
transferability of interests should be a business arrangement.  If the 
members of an arrangement can determine their shares of income 
from the arrangement without computing income at the arrange-
ment level, they do not need one of the tax regimes that govern busi-
ness arrangements.257  Thus, tax policy does not explain the IRS’s 
transferability requirement.  The use of mechanisms in the co-
ownership and management agreements that minimize the threat of 
sale or partition indicates that open tenancy-in-common co-owners 
prefer transfer and partition restrictions.  The use of such restrictions 
is likely a reaction to the right-to-partition requirement. 
Because tax theory does not require co-owners to have the rights 
to partition for an arrangement to be a tenancy-in-common, the IRS 
could remove the right-to-partition requirement from its guidance.  
Doing so would solve the issue related to free transferability.  If co-
owners did not have to concern themselves with others partitioning 
the property, they would be less concerned about who joined the ar-
rangement as a co-owner.  Consequently, they would naturally relax 
restrictions on alienability.  That would provide an additional check 
on management performance.  Co-owners would not demand the 
 251 See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02. 
 252 See supra text accompanying notes 247–28. 
 253 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(vi) (1960). 
 254 See id. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006). 
 255 I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2000). Tax law will, however, treat some publicly traded part-
nerships and limited liability companies as tax corporations, but that determination 
does not depend upon the transferability of the arrangement’s interests.  See id. 
 256 See supra text accompanying notes 171–77 (discussing the inappropriate use of 
entity characteristics for classifying tenancies-in-common). 
 257 See Borden, supra note 140. 
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right to partition because they have other remedies under the co-
ownership arrangement.  Thus, the IRS should remove the right-to-
partition requirement from its guidance. 
Even with the right to partition, another impediment would 
stand in the way of free transferability of interests.  As discussed 
above, the IRS’s guidance requires unanimous consent for some ac-
tions.258  All other actions require approval by co-owners owning a ma-
jority of interests in the property.259  The unanimous-consent re-
quirement, in particular, presents potential for a minority holdup.  
The co-owner with the smallest ownership interest can hold up the 
hiring of a manager, the entrance of a new tenant, and financing ar-
rangements.260  Such potential makes open tenancy-in-common in-
terests less attractive.  To prevent such possibilities, co-owners or man-
agers will acquire call options in all interests.  If a minority co-owner 
threatens to hold up a decision requiring unanimous approval, the 
other co-owners or manager may prevent the hold up by exercising 
the call option.  Such options restrict transferability of interests. 
The unanimous-consent requirement and the right-to-partition 
requirement create incentives for co-owners to restrict the transfer-
ability of interests in open tenancies-in-common.  Those incentives 
run contrary to the IRS’s free-transferability requirement because co-
owners will use call options and other permissible mechanisms to 
prevent partition of the property and minority holdup.  Because tax 
theory does not require tenancies-in-common to grant partition 
rights or require unanimous consent, the IRS should consider elimi-
nating those requirements to help eliminate the transfer restrictions 
that co-owners implement. 
IV. FUTURE OF OPEN TENANCIES-IN-COMMON 
The recent market downturn has diminished the demand for 
open tenancies-in-common.261  The rhetoric growth and recent di-
minished demand for open tenancies-in-common raise several ques-
tions about their relevance.  First, are open tenancies-in-common vi-
 258 See supra text accompanying notes 159. 
 259 Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 260 See id. 
 261 See TIC Industry Quarterly Statistics, TIC|TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, 
LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah) Fall 2008 at 4. (revealing that total equity invested in se-
curitized open tenancies-in-common in through the first two quarters of 2008 was no 
more than $800 million, a small fraction of the $3.7 billion peak in 2006—assuming 
sustained performance through the end of 2008, the total 2008 investment in securi-
tized open tenancies-in-common would be less than fifty percent of the 2006 
amount). 
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able absent the section 1031 tax preference?  Second, assuming tax 
law continues to favor interests in open tenancies-in-common, should 
tax law preserve the cumbersome, and often uneconomic, structures 
of open tenancies-in-common?  Finally, are aspects and innovations 
of open tenancies-in-common transferable to close tenancies-in-
common? 
A. Viability in Absence of Section 1031 Benefits 
As discussed above, open tenancies-in-common are the brain 
child of entrepreneurial real estate syndicators who seized an oppor-
tunity to provide accessible section 1031 replacement property to a 
particular market segment.262  Generally, open tenancy-in-common 
investors are property owners looking to relieve themselves of prop-
erty management responsibilities, preserve the value of their property 
through section 1031 gain deferral, and maintain or improve the re-
turn they have been realizing on their investments.  Because investors 
generally can find similar non-tax characteristics in other real estate 
investment vehicles, section 1031 appears to influence the choice to 
invest in open tenancies-in-common.  Some investors consider the 
front-end tax consequences of the investment in an open tenancy-in-
common.  Those investors want to invest section 1031 proceeds in 
real estate to avoid tax on the disposition of their relinquished prop-
erty.  Other open tenancy-in-common investors may be attracted by 
the back-end tax consequences.  The tax classification of open tenan-
cies-in-common enables the investors to dispose of an open tenancy-
in-common interest tax free, if they reinvest the sales proceeds in like-
kind real property.  Consequently, some open tenancy-in-common 
investors bring non-exchange money to open tenancies-in-common, 
but they consider the back-end tax consequences when making the 
investment.  Thus, section 1031 motivates both front-end and back-
end open tenancy-in-common investors. 
Because open tenancies-in-common focus primarily on the tax 
benefits of section 1031, one thesis is that they would not exist but for 
section 1031.  To test that thesis, consider what an investor would do 
if section 1031 did not benefit open tenancies-in-common.  Assume 
Olivia owns real property that she manages.  Olivia decides to divest 
the property to relieve herself of property-management responsibili-
ties.  Assuming section 1031 does not grant preference to open ten-
ancy-in-common interests, Olivia will recognize taxable gain on the 
disposition, regardless of where she invests the proceeds from the sale 
 262 See supra text accompanying notes 9–12. 
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of her property.  She wants to reinvest in real estate, but she does not 
want to have any management responsibilities.  She has decided that 
the best way to obtain her objectives is to invest in some form of open 
real estate ownership arrangement.  Her investment choices include 
an open tenancy-in-common, an interest in a limited partnership 
holding real estate, or stock in a real estate investment trust 
(REIT).263  Various factors will affect Olivia’s reinvestment decision. 
For example, Olivia will likely consider the liquidity of the interest 
she acquires, the extent to which co-owners control or influence the 
manager, her exposure to liability, the simplicity of the arrangement, 
and the tax treatment of the various alternati
The three alternatives offer varying degrees of liquidity.  An in-
terest in a publicly-traded REIT would provide significant liquidity.  
Although interests in open tenancies-in-common are ostensibly trans-
ferable, they may have no secondary market, and transfer restrictions 
may make dispositions of open tenancy-in-common interests difficult.  
The threat of a rogue co-owner threatening to partition the property 
would also negatively affect the marketability of an interest.  The in-
terest in the limited partnership may be publicly traded, and, there-
fore, it may be very marketable.264  If interests in the limited partner-
ship are publicly traded, however, her investment would be liquid.  
Thus, if Olivia prefers a liquid investment, her choice will be between 
the interest in a publicly-traded REIT and a publicly-traded limited 
partnership.  An interest in an open tenancy- in-common would be 
less liquid because a secondary market for such interests has not de-
veloped, and it would be subject to some transfer restrictions.265 
Although Olivia will be one of numerous members of the ar-
rangement in which she invests, she will likely be concerned about 
the extent to which co-owners may control or influence management.  
In typical open business arrangements that separate ownership from 
management, owners often use profit sharing and equity compensa-
tion to help align managers’ interests with the owners.266  Thus, even 
though individual members may not carry significant influence, as a 
 263 A REIT is a tax-favored real estate ownership structure that can avoid entity 
level tax by distributing or reinvesting its income.  See I.R.C. § 857(b) (2000).  Mem-
bers of REITs pay tax on income they receive from the REIT.  See id.  Therefore, 
REITs are not subject to the double-tax regime that applies to tax corporations. 
 264 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 22-24 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. 
Pub. Research Working Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003790 (describing economic and legal attrib-
utes of publicly traded partnerships and REITs). 
 265 See supra text accompanying notes 250. 
 266 See supra note 204. 
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body, the owners may establish policies that help influence manager 
behavior.  Co-owners of open tenancies-in-common cannot use profit 
sharing to influence manager behavior.267  Instead, co-owners vote 
annually to retain managers, but often a negative vote is subject to 
buyout provisions that could cost the dissenter an interest in the ar-
rangement.268  The managers of open tenancies-in-common retain 
significant control over their rights to manage the property.269  Fur-
thermore, the lack of a public market for interests in open tenancies-
in-common may exert less pressure on managers to act in the best in-
terests of the co-owners.  Even though the promoters/managers must 
disclose their prior performance in offering memoranda, that infor-
mation may travel slower than information relating to a publicly 
traded company.  Thus, co-owners in open tenancies-in-common ap-
pear to have less influence over managers than do owners of other 
types of open real estate ownership arrangements.  That would tend 
to lead Olivia to an investment form other than an open tenancy-in-
common. 
Olivia will likely wish to protect herself from liability arising from 
the management and ownership of the property.  Each of the three 
alternatives can provide her liability protection.  Owners of limited 
partnership interests and interests in REITs are protected by statutory 
limited liability.270  Co-owners of open tenancy-in-common interests 
can form wholly owned limited liability companies to hold their indi-
vidual interests.271  Because Olivia can obtain limited liability with any 
of the alternatives, liability protection likely would not influence her 
decision. 
The arrangement’s simplicity will be important to Olivia, be-
cause it will affect her understanding of the arrangement and the cost 
to structure and manage it.  Open tenancies-in-common are contrac-
tual arrangements governed by common law.  They require extensive 
documentation and do not have a long track record.  Many questions 
 267 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733. 
 268 See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda—P.M., supra note 49.  Even 
though the dissenter may receive fair value for the interest, if the investor is unable 
to reinvest in like-kind property pursuant to section 1031, the tax liability of the 
transaction would diminish the benefit of the buyout. 
 269 See supra note 72. 
 270 See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303, 6A U.L.A. 418 (2008) (providing that limited 
partners are not liable for partnership liabilities); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 
(2007) (providing that shareholders are not liable for acts or debts of the corpora-
tion). 
 271 Such ownership does not frustrate the direct ownership requirement in the 
IRS’s guidance.  See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing co-
ownership through a disregarded entity). 
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still exist regarding legal aspects of open tenancies-in-common.272  
Limited partnerships and corporations are the product of state statu-
tory law.  State law may grant contractual freedom to members of 
such arrangements, but the law generally provides default rules for 
those areas not addressed in contracts.273  That statutory structure 
adds certainty to the formation, ownership, and management of such 
arrangements.  Consequently, such arrangements are generally sim-
pler than open tenancies-in-common.  Furthermore, the prevalence 
and history of other arrangements make them more familiar to inves-
tors and advisors.  Thus, Olivia will prefer the simplicity of the other 
arrangements over the open tenancy-in-common. 
Finally, Olivia will consider the taxation of the various arrange-
ments.  If Olivia acquires an interest in a limited partnership, she will 
generally be taxed on her allocable share of partnership tax items in 
accordance with the partnership agreement.274  Partners may also 
benefit from allocations of partnership liabilities.275  Consequently, 
tax partnerships are attractive forms of business arrangements.  
REITs provide less tax latitude for allocating tax items, but they allow 
the owners to obtain a single level of taxation in any business form.276  
Thus, if Olivia prefers an interest in a publicly traded company, she 
may prefer stock in a REIT.  If Olivia acquires an interest in an open 
tenancy-in-common, she will be taxed on income from her interest in 
the property.  The tax treatment of the various alternatives does not 
provide a definitive choice for Olivia.  Each alternative has unique tax 
treatment, but no one single tax treatment is clearly better than the 
others in all situations.  Olivia will have to choose from the various al-
ternatives based upon her individual preferences. 
This analysis does not conclusively identify the investment vehi-
cle Olivia would choose in the absence of section 1031 nonrecogni-
tion.  Simplicity, liquidity, and owner control favor the limited part-
nership and REIT investments.  Tax aspects of the various 
arrangements do not factor in as a general matter.  Consequently, 
simplicity, liquidity, and owner control indicate that Olivia would 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 123–211 (questioning whether state law will 
accept the classification of open tenancies-in-common). 
 273 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 237. 
 274 I.R.C. § 704(a) (2000).  The IRS will respect allocations expressed in the part-
nership agreement if they have substantial economic effect.  See § 704(b). 
 275 See id. § 752 (providing that changes in partners’ shares of partnership liabili-
ties are constructive contributions or distributions); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (as 
amended in 2006) (providing that partners may determine by contract which part-
ner will bear the obligation of a partnership liability). 
 276 See supra note 263. 
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likely choose the limited partnership or REIT over the open tenancy-
in-common, in the absence of the section 1031 benefit.  This analysis 
indicates that without section 1031 benefits investors probably would 
not acquire interests in open tenancies-in-common.  Thus, open ten-
ancies-in-common do not appear to be viable without the section 
1031 benefits.  Nonetheless, there is no indication that section 1031 
will disappear or cease to favor interests in open tenancies-in-
common.  Therefore, they will probably remain a viable part of the 
real estate market, and they deserve greater attention to help deal 
with their significant shortcomings. 
B. Disregarded Multiple-Member Arrangements 
The complexity of open tenancies-in-common is one disadvan-
tage they present.  The complexity stems in part from the IRS gener-
ally prohibiting the co-owners from owning the property indirectly 
through a commonly owned separate legal entity.277  By ruling that a 
multiple-member Delaware statutory trust, if properly formed and 
structured, may be disregarded for federal tax purposes,278 the IRS 
has already allowed a multiple-member legal entity to be an open te-
nancy-in-common.  That ruling suggests that perhaps different legal 
entities (such as limited liability companies or limited partnerships)279 
should also be disregarded, if properly formed and structured.  The 
tax issue is whether an arrangement with a separate legal entity hold-
ing the property should be treated as a separate entity for tax pur-
poses.  If treated as a separate entity, the arrangement would be a tax 
partnership, and the interests could not qualify for section 1031 non-
recognition.280  The definition of tax partnership should govern that 
 277 Other sources of complexity are the unanimous-consent and right-to-partition 
requirements discussed supra at text accompanying notes 159–79,242–61. 
 278 See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191; supra Part II.C. (discussing the use of 
Delaware statutory trusts to own open tenancy-in-common property). 
 279 Some states allow the formation of limited partnerships with the general part-
ner taking no economic interest in the arrangement.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. ANN § 
153.101(c) (Vernon 2006).  Such a structure would permit a nonowner to manage 
the property. 
 280 See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excluding partnership interests from assets 
eligible for section 1031 nonrecognition); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (as amended in 
2006) (providing a general definition of separate entity); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as 
amended in 2007) (defining business entity and providing that an arrangement in-
corporated under state law shall be a tax corporation); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as 
amended in 2006) (providing that all multiple-member business entities that are not 
tax corporations are tax partnerships by default or tax corporations by election). 
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classification, and partnership tax theory should influence the defini-
tion.281 
As stated above, partnership tax theory suggests that an ar-
rangement should be a tax partnership only if it needs the partner-
ship tax accounting and reporting rules.282  That need arises only if 
members have a residual claim in both the property and services of 
the arrangement.283  The freedom to contract in limited liability com-
panies and all forms of partnership allows the members to create ar-
rangements that separate the residual claims of property from resid-
ual claims of services.  For example, the parties may agree that the 
service provider, i.e., the manager, will receive a membership interest 
in a limited liability company but restrict the manager’s control of the 
property.284  The limited liability company’s operating agreement may 
limit the manager’s vote on matters such as decisions to dispose of 
the property, encumber it, or alter lease terms in the case of a prop-
erty with major tenants.  The other owners may retain the right to 
remove the manager by majority vote and terminate the employment 
arrangement by distributing any unpaid share of profits. 
As states continue to relax the default rules of noncorporate en-
tities (by extending the availability of statutory trusts, for example), 
individuals will have greater freedom to structure ownership ar-
rangements with legal entities.  The IRS should recognize that free-
dom and allow co-owners to indirectly own property in open tenan-
cies-in-common through mutually owned legal entities.  Through 
those separate entities, the co-owners could contract with a property 
manager, enter into leases, and borrow against the property.  The use 
of a separate legal entity would likely deprive co-owners of the right 
to partition the property.  As stated above, however, the right to parti-
tion does not appear to be essential to tenancy-in-common classifica-
tion and should be eliminated from the IRS’s guidance.285  Once 
freed from that burden, the interests would be more freely transfer-
able, and a separate legal entity would facilitate such transferability, 
eliminating some of the major complexities of open tenancies-in-
common. 
 281 See Borden, supra note 24, at 931–32. 
 282 See supra text accompanying notes 139–44. 
 283 See Borden, supra note 140. 
 284 The Author suggests in another venue that private equity managers may in-
deed be employed by investors even though they become members of limited part-
nerships.  See Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1262493. 
 285 See supra text accompanying notes 251–56. 
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C. Transferable New Knowledge 
Bringing together several unassociated persons to form an open 
tenancy-in-common merges disparate interests and creates a signifi-
cant pool of resources.  The pool of resources is sufficient to attract 
legal advisors, tax advisors, and the IRS to carefully consider the is-
sues in depth and create new ownership structures.  Concepts that re-
sult from that work are now available to lawyers advising members of 
close tenancies-in-common.  Aspects of open tenancy-in-common 
structures will be attractive to members of close tenancies-in-
common.286  For example, the revenue- and expense-sharing provi-
sions in open tenancy-in-common arrangements would help elimi-
nate some of the uncertainty regarding co-owners’ rights to income 
and obligations for expenses under common law.  The rights of first 
offer and first refusal and option agreements in open tenancy-in-
common documents would help co-owners of close tenancies-in-
common restrict the transferability and partition rights of their co-
owners.287 
The management and lease structures used by open tenancies-
in-common may also benefit co-owners of close tenancies-in-common.  
Instead of an independent third party managing the property, how-
ever, a co-owner of a close tenancy-in-common will likely manage the 
property either directly or through a closely-held management com-
pany.288  The co-ownership and management agreements will have to 
limit the scope of services that a co-owner can provide to ensure 
compliance with the IRS’s guidance.289  Nonetheless, the open ten-
ancy-in-common structure can provide guidance to the advisor creat-
ing the close-tenancy-in-common structure.  If limited management 
creates problems, then the parties may decide to use a master-lease 
structure.  Again, models of open tenancies-in-common will inform 
the creation of such structures for close tenancies-in-common. 
Because open tenancies-in-common generally comply with the 
IRS’s guidance, the IRS should not challenge the classification of 
close tenancies-in-common that adopt features of open tenancies-in-
 286 Documents drafted for close tenancies-in-common incorporate features of 
open tenancies-in-common, providing evidence that close tenancies-in-common will 
adopt features of open tenancies-in-common.  See, e.g., BORDEN, supra note 11, app. F. 
 287 See id. at F-6 through F-7 (providing examples of buy-sell agreements that may 
appear in documents used by co-owners of close tenancies-in-common). 
 288 See id. at app. F (providing sample documents that comtemplate an affiliate of 
one of the co-owners managing the property but providing no more than customary 
tenant services). 
 289 See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (limiting the services that a co-
owner can provide to customary tenant services). 
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common.290  In fact, the IRS has ruled privately that its guidance also 
applies to close tenancies-in-common.291  The effort that lawyers and 
others have devoted to structure open tenancies-in-common will serve 
advisors of close tenancies-in-common who also wish to structure 
ownership arrangements to comply with the IRS’s guidance.  Thus, 
many aspects of open tenancies-in-common may find application in 
close tenancies-in-common.  Adopting already-created concepts gives 
members of smaller arrangements access to tools formerly unavail-
able due to resource restrictions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even if open tenancies-in-common would not exist without the 
demand created by the tax law, tax law currently supports open ten-
ancies-in-common and greater attention should focus on them.  More 
attention from academics and commentators outside the tax realm 
will help this new form of investment vehicle evolve in a manner that 
will provide greater protection for investors and more direction for 
promoters, broker-dealers, and other market participants.  Open ten-
ancies-in-common differ from close tenancies-in-common primarily 
in their ownership composition.  The different ownership composi-
tion affects the economic nature of the two types of tenancies-in-
common.  Consequently, the parties to the various types of arrange-
ments often seek different legal attributes in the differing arrange-
ments. 
A significant body of economic research and analysis considers 
close and open business arrangements such as corporations, partner-
ships, and limited liability companies.  That analysis helps explain 
why business participants form arrangements that separate ownership 
and management, and use various legal mechanisms to establish the 
relationship among co-owners and between owners and managers.  
Tax commentators have also focused extensive efforts on explaining 
the perceived need (or lack thereof) of different tax regimes for close 
and open business arrangements.  Little attention, however, has fo-
cused on the various aspects of open and close tenancies-in-common.  
The comparisons of close and open business arrangements help in-
form the analysis of closed and open tenancies-in-common.  This Ar-
ticle demonstrates that such commentary and analysis helps expose 
weaknesses in the IRS’s guidance and provides grounds for recom-
 290 See supra text accompanying note 98 (discussing the legal significance of the 
IRS’s guidance). 
 291 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-26-005 (June 27, 2008). 
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mending change.  Further analysis should help refine the structures 
further and lead to better guidance from the IRS.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF CLOSE AND OPEN  
TENANCIES-IN-COMMON AND BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Close Tenancy-
in-Common 
Open Tenancy-
in-Common 
Close Business 
Arrangement 
Open Business 
Arrangement 
Direct ownership of 
interest in property. 
Direct ownership of 
interest in property. 
Indirect ownership 
of property. 
Indirect ownership  
of property. 
No limit on number 
of co-owners. 
Thirty-five-co-owner 
limit. 
No limit on number 
of members. 
No limit on number 
of members. 
Intent of parties rele-
vant to classification. 
Intent to form busi-
ness arrangement 
prohibited. 
Intent of parties  
relevant to classifica-
tion. 
Intent of parties rele-
vant to classification. 
No business form. Business entity  
prohibited. 
Partnership, limited 
liability company,  
corporation, or other 
legal form. 
Partnership, limited 
liability company,  
corporation, or other  
legal form. 
Co-ownership 
agreement tradition-
ally informal, if  
extant. 
Formal co-ownership 
agreement. 
Less formal govern-
ing documents. 
Formal governing 
documents. 
Right to sell interest 
or partition. 
Right of first  
refusal/ offer before 
exercising right to 
partition, call  
options 
Buy-sell agreements 
typical. 
Typically publicly 
traded. 
Unity of possession 
grants each co-owner 
right to manage 
property, hire a 
manager, or lease  
interests.  Co-owners 
cannot sell or  
encumber other  
co-owners’ interests. 
Unanimous  
approval to hire 
manager, sell, or 
lease property, and 
to create or modify 
blanket lien.  Co-
owners can only  
provide customary 
tenant services.   
Ownership and  
management typi-
cally combined, but 
all management au-
thority is delegable. 
Ownership and  
management typically 
separate. 
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Close Tenancy-
in-Common 
Open Tenancy-
in-Common 
Close Business 
Arrangement 
Open Business 
Arrangement 
Action of account, 
action for contribu-
tion, and action of 
waste determine co-
owners rights to in-
come and obligations 
for expenses.  
Co-owners must 
share revenues and 
expenses in propor-
tion to ownership in-
terests. 
If governing  
documents are  
silent, state law will 
generally allocate 
income and loss 
equally. 
Governing documents 
should determine how 
and when profits are 
distributed. 
Co-owners may enter 
into agreements that 
determine their  
respective shares of 
blanket-lien indebt-
edness. 
Co-owners must 
share blanket-lien 
mortgage in  
proportion to owner-
ship  
interests. 
Owners are jointly 
and severally liable 
for business liabili-
ties, unless organ-
ized as a limited 
partnership, limited 
liability company, or 
corporation. 
Members not liable 
for business liabilities. 
No restrictions on 
methods used to  
determine manager 
compensation. 
Sharing profits with 
managers is prohib-
ited. 
No restrictions on 
methods used to  
determine manager 
compensation. 
No restrictions on  
methods used to  
determine manager 
compensation. 
 
 
